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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court frequently
has invoked federalism principles when reviewing federal legislation1
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. Many thanks to Randy
Bezanson, Stephanos Bibas, Bill Buss, Erwin Chemerinsky, Herb Hovenkamp, Shelly Kurtz, and
the participants in a faculty colloquium at Boston College Law School for generously providing
their remarks.
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but has failed to articulate an overarching vision of federal-state
relations. 2 The Court has relied instead on seemingly disparate
premises, including a local-national distinction that some believe is
disingenuous, 3  notions of "commandeering" and political
accountability that some believe are poorly rationalized, 4 and a
conception of state dignity that critics charge is ill suited for a nation
in which the people are sovereign. 5 The Court does occasionally recite
1. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1871-79 (2002)
(holding that states are immune from private actions brought before federal administrative
tribunals and that Congress cannot abrogate that immunity pursuant to its Article I powers);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-27 (2000) (holding that Congress unconstitutionally
intruded upon local, noneconomic matters when it created a civil remedy for victims of gender-
motivated violence); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 741-54 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot
abrogate the states' immunity from suit in state courts pursuant to its Article I powers); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-25 (1997) (holding that Congress unconstitutionally
commandeered state executive officials when it required them to perform background checks on
prospective gun purchasers); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57-73 (1996) (holding
that Congress cannot abrogate the states' immunity from suit in federal courts pursuant to its
Article I powers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-68 (1995) (holding that Congress
unconstitutionally intruded upon local, noneconomic matters when it banned the possession of
firearms near schools); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-69, 174-77 (1992) (holding
that Congress unconstitutionally compelled the states to regulate when it threatened to force the
states to take title to radioactive waste); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456-67 (1991)
(holding that federalism required Congress plainly to express its intent to protect state judges
with antidiscrimination legislation).
2. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the "Sounds of Sovereignty" but Missing the
Beat: Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REV. 11, 14 (1998) (stating that the
Court has not "articulate[d] a coherent theory of federalism that explains the discrete results
reached in particular cases and that would facilitate reasonably accurate predictions regarding
the probable results in future cases"); Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 431, 518 (2002) ("The Rehnquist Court lacks a coherent federalism philosophy.").
3. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (emphasizing the need to distinguish "between
what is truly national and what is truly local"); see also Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism:
Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 619-22, 629-56 (2001) (arguing against a
simple local-national distinction and pointing out the numerous ways in which the federal
government regulates family life).
4. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-25 (holding that Congress cannot commandeer state
executive officials); New York, 505 U.S. at 155-69, 174-77 (holding that Congress cannot
commandeer state legislators); see also Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette
of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 143 ("There is simply no
difference, even in general, between permissible preemption and impermissible commandeering
with respect to the [commonly understood values of federalism]."); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual
Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 822-30 (1998) (arguing that Printz and New York fail
to explain why federal coercion is more objectionable than both federal preemption and instances
in which the states agree to implement federal policy).
5. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 (stating that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
protects the states' "sovereign dignity"); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity:
Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1040 (2000) (stating that the
Court's conception of state dignity appears "drawn from royal dignity-hardly a promising
doctrinal source in a democratic republic"); cf. Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE
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the perceived benefits of federalism, but those benefits are framed at
such a high level of abstraction that they provide little guidance as to
the manner (if any) in which the Constitution requires that regulatory
power be distributed between the state and federal governments. 6
Even those benefits themselves have been challenged, with numerous
scholars arguing that much of what judges and politicians say about
federalism is merely politics-driven rhetoric. 7
Courts and politicians alike, however, need a strong normative
sense of how our federal system of government ought to function. For
courts in particular, a robust theory of federalism is not a mere
luxury. When a litigant asks a court to strike down or uphold
legislation on federalism grounds, the court almost invariably is
confronted with vague constitutional texts, histories that are subject
to conflicting interpretations, and precedents that point in more than
one direction. To a significant extent, therefore, the court's ruling will
be shaped by its own understanding of both federalism and the
judiciary's role in preserving it. What should that understanding be?
In their quest to comprehend federalism, jurists have devoted
considerable attention to the benefits that may be achieved when state
and local governments compete with one another for a mobile
citizenry. Prompted in part by Charles Tiebout's famous 1956 article,8
DAME L. REV. 1121, 1126-31 (2000) (arguing that, by speaking of state "dignity," the Court
unjustifiably treats the states as persons).
6. In Gregory, for example, the Court stated:
[Federalism] assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the
diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by putting
the States in competition for a mobile citizenry. [t also places] a check on abuses of
government power.
501 U.S. at 458.
7. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1997) ("The
values of federalism are invoked regularly in much the same way as 'Mom' and 'apple pie': warm
images with little content."); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the
Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L.
REV. 265, 265 (1990) (stating that federalism is "one of the most revered sacred cows on the
American political scene" and that people invoke principles of state autonomy or federal
supremacy, depending on their political objectives); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 907-08 (1994) (arguing
that federalism "achieves none of the beneficial goals that the Court claims for it").
8. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
In his article, Tiebout attempted to identify "the mechanism by which consumer-voters register
their preferences for public goods." Id. at 417. He argued that, under the proper conditions, a
marketlike restraint is placed on local governments' expenditures-thereby rendering such
expenditures more efficient-by virtue of the fact that local governments compete with one
another for citizens by offering varying combinations of taxes and public goods, and that citizens
cast their vote for the combinations they prefer by moving to the most appealing jurisdictions. Id.
at 417-19; cf. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 258 (1948) ("The
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many have wedded themselves to the view that horizontal competition
among states and localities helps to ensure that citizens will have an
array of governmental options from which to choose and that
governments will have a marketlike incentive to satisfy citizens'
demands in increasingly efficient ways. 9 This argument finds a close
cousin in the frequent observation that states and localities serve as
laboratories for testing social and economic programs. 10
Courts and scholars have been remarkably silent, however, on
the subject of a very different competition-a competition that the
Framers not only contemplated but also expressly urged as one of the
benefits of federalism. The Federalist Papers clearly suggest that the
Framers believed federalism would foster a vertical competition
between the states and the federal government for the people's
"affection."'" Although I describe this forgotten dimension of the
absence of tariff walls and the free movements of men and capital between the states ... limit to
a great extent the scope of the economic policy of the individual states.").
9. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (stating that federalism "makes government more
responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry"); MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL
FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN 2 (1999) ("Federalism is about
competition among the states."); Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 478 (1991)
(arguing that judicial scrutiny of land-use exactions is often unnecessary because local
governments' competition for real-estate development will constrain them from overreaching);
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize
Same-Sex Marriages, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 747-48 (1995) (arguing that competition for tourists
gives each state an incentive to be among the first to solemnize same-sex marriages); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 33-40 (1983)
(discussing interstate competition and the regulation of monopolies); Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2361
(1998) (proposing to extend "the competition among the states for corporate charters to two of the
three principal components of federal securities regulation"); Symposium, Constructing a New
Federalism: Jurisdictional Competence and Competition, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1996) (presenting
articles on theoretical models of competition and on matters relating to environmental
regulation, welfare policy, torts, and individual rights). For an introduction to the voluminous
literature on Tiebout's model, see COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds.,
1991) [hereinafter COMPETITION AMONG STATES].
10. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(concluding that, by banning guns near schools, Congress "forecloses the States from
experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right
of history and expertise"); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that federalism enables the states to serve as
laboratories for social, economic, and political experimentation and providing examples); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (endorsing localities' varying
approaches to public education); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
11. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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Framers' vision in greater detail below, 12 its essence is easily
summarized. Each time a government acts or refuses to act, it further
develops its reputation among its constituents. If a government
satisfactorily regulates a given matter, it can expect to earn an added
measure of its citizens' affection (or trust, confidence, allegiance, or
loyalty-terms that I shall employ as synonyms, notwithstanding
their different shades of meaning). The more areas that a government
regulates satisfactorily, the greater the affection it can expect to earn
and thus the greater the responsibilities it can expect citizens to
confer upon it. Because there are many areas in which the state and
federal governments' legislative powers overlap, however, if one
government regulates an activity in an unsatisfactory manner, the
people may be able to shift responsibility to the other sovereign. 13
With two separate governments vying to win their trust, the Framers
reasoned, the people would be free continually to assess the
sovereigns' conduct and capabilities, and to confer or withdraw
regulatory power as they deemed appropriate. Regardless of whether
state and federal politicians ever think of themselves as rivals,
therefore, they are indeed competitors. They compete in what I shall
call the marketplace for the people's affection-a marketplace in
which citizens allocate regulatory power based upon which sovereign
has made the strongest claim to their confidence.
While acknowledging that Congress assumed an extraordinary
measure of power during the past century, 14 the Court has not
characterized the federal government's ascendancy as a function of
vertical competition for the people's affection. Nor has the Court even
identified federal-state competition as a federalism value to be sought
and preserved. The Court has acknowledged that the federal and state
governments are designed to hold one another in check, but the
Court's explanation of that principle rests primarily on the proposition
that federalism prevents tyranny in the same way that dividing
federal power among three branches prevents tyranny-it avoids
concentrating power in a single set of hands. 15 In a concurring opinion
in Lopez, Justice Kennedy briefly noted that the two sovereigns "hold
12. See infra notes 30-63 and accompanying text.
13. I frequently will refer to state and federal governments as "sovereigns," even though
sovereignty ultimately lies with the people. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 402-05
(1819).
14. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (stating that "[t]he
Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the
Framers").
15. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991).
333
334 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:329
each other in check by competing for the affections of the people."'
16
Like the scholarly community, 17 however, when the Court discusses
competition in the context of federalism, it is almost invariably
competition of the horizontal, interstate variety. Consequently, as
Akhil Reed Amar has observed, our understanding of federal-state
competition is significantly underdeveloped.
I8
There are good reasons, however, why we should consider
expanding our conception of federalism's competition-derived benefits
beyond the confines of competition among state and local
governments. First, there is obvious tension between the notions of
horizontal and vertical competition, and before we tether ourselves
tightly to the former, we should be certain we are uninterested in the
latter. If our objective is to promote competition among the states, we
likely will urge Congress to abstain from substantive regulation so
that the states have plenty of room in which to distinguish themselves
from one another.1 9 If, instead, our objective is to promote competition
between the states and the federal government, we likely will urge
Congress to exercise its enumerated powers in whatever ways it
thinks the voters desire. One cannot reconcile those conflicting
objectives by focusing solely on the benefits of interstate competition.
Second, while many legal scholars have placed their faith in
the assumptions underlying economic models of interstate
competition, many economists remain troubled by those assumptions
and have abandoned the simplistic notion that devolving power upon
16. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); cf. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617
n.7 (acknowledging that "public opinion" often operates as a restraint "on the congressional
exercise of the commerce power").
17. See John Kincaid, The Competitive Challenge to Cooperative Federalism: A Theory of
Federal Democracy, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES, supra note 9, at 87, 89-90 (observing that
scholars have focused on horizontal competition and have largely ignored vertical competition). A
number of scholars have briefly noted the existence of both vertical and horizontal competition,
but then have chosen to focus almost exclusively on the latter. See, e.g., THOMAS R. DYE,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS XV-XVI (1990); DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 76 (1995).
18. See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1229, 1236-40 (1994) (stating that we need to understand better how federal-state
competition preserves liberty beyond merely diffusing power between two sovereigns).
19. See, e.g., DYE, supra note 17, at 5 ("Federalism must grant some political and financial
independence, some responsibility for deciding about policy and paying for these policy decisions,
to state and local governments if they are to be truly competitive [with one another].");
Krotoszynski, supra note 2, at 21-22 (arguing that, when the federal government acts, it nullifies
competition among the states, thereby depriving citizens of a choice among regulatory
alternatives); David G. Wille, The Commerce Clause: A Time for Reevaluation, 70 TUL. L. REV.
1069, 1081 (1996) (stating that an "overambitious Congress" might regulate too heavily, thereby
undercutting the benefits that accrue when state and local governments compete with one
another to meet citizens' needs).
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the states will always lead to welfare-enhancing competition. 20
William Bratton and Joseph McCahery persuasively argue, for
example, that states do not always compete with one another, that
interstate competition does not always yield regulations that match
citizens' preferences, that centralization often may be desirable, and
that proponents of devolution in any given area bear the burden of
demonstrating that economic theories of interstate competition are
appropriately applied to that subject matter.21
Third, by focusing primarily on economic incentives, scholarly
and judicial writings on horizontal competition fail to take full account
of the social and psychological forces that help to shape how citizens
regard their governments. Citizens certainly do care about the
efficiency with which their governments use tax revenues, for
example, but such economic concerns tell only part of the story. The
Framers' notion of "affection" encourages one to consider the broader
range of factors-both economic and noneconomic-that often cause
citizens to feel a stronger sense of identification with or loyalty to one
sovereign rather than the other.
Fourth, while the Framers were largely silent on the subject of
competition among the states, they said a great deal regarding
competition between the states and the federal government. 22 While
we need not limit our own understanding of federalism's benefits to
that of Hamilton, Madison, and the others, it does seem that
arguments made in support of the Constitution's ratification should
continue to play at least some role in federalism debates until they
have been proven unmeritorious. 23
20. For a discussion of legal scholars' tendency to overstate the connections between
devolution, competition, and efficiency, see William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New
Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86
GEO. L.J. 201 (1997). Bratton and McCahery argue that, unlike economists, the legal community
has not appreciated the weakness of the Tiebout model, and that legal scholars have been too
eager to support their contentions with outdated economic assumptions. Id. at 205, 219-21, 278.
Tiebout himself acknowledged that his assumptions do not always reflect reality. See Tiebout,
supra note 8, at 423 (acknowledging that citizens are not always able to move to a more desirable
jurisdiction, that citizens lack perfect information about the alternatives offered by other
jurisdictions, and that positive and negative externalities are often imposed by one jurisdiction
upon another).
21. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 20, at 222, 262-63.
22. See GREVE, supra note 9, at 10 ("Admittedly, the Founders themselves said little about
interstate competition. The Federalist Papers emphasize competition between states and the
federal government . ); see also infra notes 30-63 and accompanying text (describing the
Framers' vision).
23. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 734-35 (1999) (focusing on the Framers'
understanding of states' sovereign immunity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995)




Finally, the concept of federal-state competition offers an
opportunity to reach a deeper understanding of the Court's recent
federalism cases.24 As I explain below, 25 the Court's controversial
federalism rulings are all consistent with the view that the states need
the judiciary's assistance if they are to remain able to compete with
the federal government for the people's affection. The notion of vertical
competition not only thereby points the way toward a theory of
federalism that helps to explain the Court's recent intervention in a
variety of settings, but it also enables one to build a bridge between
those rulings and the process-focused conception of federalism to
which they often are seen as starkly opposed-namely, the conception
of federalism articulated in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.26 Although Garcia declared that the national
political process provides states with their primary protection from
federal overreaching, the Rehnquist Court frequently has sought to
protect the states by declaring federal legislation unconstitutional.
One can begin to span the chasm between those two categories of
cases by stepping back from the discrete political mechanisms
identified in Garcia and taking account of the full range of political
processes that constitute federal-state competition for the people's
affection. Ordinarily, those processes must be allowed to operate
undisturbed, so that the two sovereigns can make their best effort to
earn the people's allegiance and so that the people can assign and
withdraw responsibility as they see fit.27 The Court's recent decisions
suggest, however, that there are several ways in which the Court
believes it must protect that marketplace and thereby ensure genuine
political competition between the two sovereigns.
I proceed in two remaining parts. In Part 11,28 relying
principally on the Federalist Papers, I reintroduce the Framers'
understanding of federalism as a form of government that encourages
the two sovereigns to compete for the people's affection. I argue that,
for all areas in which the Constitution stops short of assigning
24. See supra note 1 (listing the Rehnquist Court's leading federalism rulings).
25. See infra notes 124-250 and accompanying text.
26. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, the Court declared that "[s]tate sovereign interests...
are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal
system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." Id. at 552. As examples of those
safeguards, the Court pointed to states' control over electoral qualifications and over the
Electoral College's composition, and to states' equal representation in the Senate. Id. at 551. The
Court also noted, however, that states find additional protection in "the limitation on federal
authority inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers." Id. at 550; see also
infra notes 139, 184, 188 (discussing Garcia).
27. See infra notes 30-63 and accompanying text (describing federal-state competition).
28. See infra notes 30-102 and accompanying text.
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exclusive responsibility to one sovereign or the other, the Framers
believed citizens would continually reassess the actual distribution of
power between the sovereigns to ensure that no alternative
distribution would better serve their interests. In making that
determination, the Framers predicted, the people would be greatly
influenced by the extent to which each sovereign had earned the
people's confidence. I then argue that, although certain features of the
Framers' expectations have failed to withstand the test of time, the
Framers' fundamental vision of federal-state competition remains a
powerful tool for making descriptive observations about American
politics.
In Part 1II,29 I argue that at least three requirements must be
met if the two sovereigns are to compete with one another in the way
that the Framers expected: each must possess a "proving ground," a
domain in which it is assured of an opportunity to display its
regulatory competence; each must be sufficiently autonomous from the
other to enable it to make its own strategic decisions about how to
earn the people's confidence; and the sovereigns' activities and
relationships with one another must be sufficiently transparent to
enable citizens to allocate praise and blame appropriately. I then
argue that, although the Rehnquist Court has not explained its
federalism rulings in marketplace terms, those rulings appear
animated by a desire to ensure that these three market requirements
are met. I do not claim that the marketplace's three requirements
compelled the Court to decide those cases precisely in the ways that
the Court decided them. Nor do I claim that the Court has developed
all of the well-honed analytic tools it needs if it is to police the two
sovereigns' battle for the people's affection in a praiseworthy manner.
Indeed, we might ultimately conclude that the courts are competent to
play only a marginal role in maintaining the health of the federal-
state marketplace. After all, judicial intervention itself poses a
significant threat to federal-state competition-each time the courts
declare a regulatory arrangement unconstitutional on federalism
grounds, they risk undercutting the effort of one sovereign (or both) to
provide citizens with the kind of government they desire. I believe the
Rehnquist Court has become convinced, however, that there are
occasions when the states require the judiciary's protection from their
powerful federal competitor. By casting the Court's recent federalism
rulings in that light, I hope to set the stage for a long-term
examination both of the ways in which particular lawmaking
processes, governmental structures, and regulatory arrangements
29. See infra notes 103-250 and accompanying text.
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promote or hinder federal-state competition, and of the judiciary's
proper role-if any-in preserving that competition's vitality.
II. THE BATTLE FOR THE PEOPLE'S AFFECTION
A. The Framers' Vision
All students of the federal Constitution know that "[t]he
Framers split the atom of sovereignty," creating a system of
government in which citizens possess "two political capacities, one
state and one federal."30 Far less familiar is the Framers' belief that
the state and federal governments each must have an opportunity to
earn the people's "affection, esteem and reverence" by favorably
regulating matters of public concern, thereby instilling in their
constituents an "habitual sense of obligation and an active sentiment
of attachment." 31 The link the Framers perceived between government
regulation and the people's affection-between governance and the
people's trust, confidence, loyalty, and respect-was a powerful one.
Hamilton argued, for example, that "the authority of the Union and
the affections of the citizens towards it will be strengthened, rather
than weakened, by its extension to what are called matters of internal
concern," and that the more the federal government "enters into those
objects which touch the most sensible chords and put in motion the
most active springs of the human heart, the greater will be the
probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the
community."
32
The Framers believed that the nation would founder if citizens
failed to feel strong affection for their two governments. Each
sovereign needs the people's support, for example, if it is to resist
abuses of power by the other: military resistance requires financing
and soldiers, and political resistance requires a constituency.
33
30. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
For a discussion of the Framers' reasons for creating a system of dual sovereignty, see Michael
W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1492-511
(1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)).
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 11, at 120.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 176 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
33. See THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 11, at 122; THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 178-82
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459
(1991) (asserting that the two sovereigns "will act as mutual restraints only if both are credible");
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1494-507 (1987)
(explaining that the Framers intended each sovereign to be able to restrain the other militarily,
politically, and legally). For an example of Virginia's early success in militarily deterring abuses
by the federal government, see PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 8 (1995) (stating
that the Federalists chose not to challenge Jefferson's victory in the presidential election of 1800,
338 [Vol. 56:329
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Moreover, it was vital that the newly created federal government be
able to regulate individuals' activities directly, rather than through
state intermediaries, so that it could "attract to its support those
passions which have the strongest influence upon the human heart"
34
and thereby reduce the likelihood that it would have to resort to
military power to secure the people's compliance with its laws.
3 5
The Constitution's opponents feared that the federal
government would overwhelm the states in the battle for political
support.36 Specifically, they worried that the federal government and
the states frequently would enact overlapping legislation, that the
Supremacy Clause would render the states' legislation void, and that
state governments-deprived of opportunities to prove their worth to
the people-would eventually wither and die. 37 The Constitution's
proponents responded with several arguments.38 They emphasized
that the federal government's powers are "few and defined," while the
states' powers are "numerous and indefinite."3 9 They contended that
federal officials would have no interest in local affairs, since local
in part because they "realized that the Virginia state militia was at least as strong as the
remnants of the Continental Army"). For an example of Virginia's and Kentucky's comparable
successes in the political arena, see Amar, supra, at 1502-03 (describing those states' political
opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts).
34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). At
the Philadelphia Convention in June 1787, Hamilton similarly argued that one of the "great &
essential principles necessary for the support of Government [is a]n habitual attachment of the
people." III DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 AS REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 128
(James McClellan & M.E. Bradford eds., 1989) [hereinafter DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION].
35. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, supra note 34, at 115-16; THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra
note 32, at 174-77.
36. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787,
at 526-29 (1969) (describing the Antifederalists' fears of federal dominance).
37. See JACKSON T. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1781-
1788, at 124 (1961); cf. NEAL H. COGAN, CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY
COLLECTION ON PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 485-92 (1999) (reprinting
comparable arguments made by an opponent of the Constitution during the Pennsylvania
Convention in November 1787).
38. See generally Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A
View From The Federalist Papers, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1669, 1677 (1988) (summarizing the
arguments). The Framers also eventually agreed to support ratification of the Tenth
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."). For a sample of the debates regarding the Tenth Amendment's necessity, see COGAN,
supra note 37, at 506-27.
39. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); accord
THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 102 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[T]he general
government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its
jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects .... ").
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matters "hold out slender allurements to ambition."40 Indeed, the
Framers argued, the greatest risk was not that the federal
government would intrude upon matters best left to the states, but
rather that the states would encroach upon matters best left to the
federal government.41 The states would enjoy tremendous popular
support, after all, both because people tend to favor that which is local
and because the states would have primary responsibility for matters
of greatest concern to citizens. 42 Moreover, state officials would play
important roles in the election of federal officials-Senators would be
selected by state legislatures, for example-while federal officials
would play no formal role in the election of state officials and would
seek to protect their respective states' local interests.
43
The Constitution's advocates attached an important caveat to
these assurances of state vitality and dominance-a caveat that
constitutes yet another reason why power is divided between state and
federal sovereigns and why those sovereigns must be allowed to battle
for the people's affection. Namely, if the federal government earned
the people's confidence through "manifest and irresistible proofs of a
better administration," the people might "become more partial to the
federal than to State governments" and support a more expansive
federal government. 44 True sovereignty lies only with the people,
45
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 11, at 118.
41. Other nations' experiences suggested as much, and there was little reason to think that
the United States would be an exception. See id. at 120-22; THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note
39, at 289-90; cf. COGAN, supra note 37, at 501 (reprinting comparable arguments made by a
proponent of the Constitution during the Pennsylvania Convention in December 1787). Justice
Story later echoed the Framers' concern:
If... the State governments could engross all the affections of the people, to the
exclusion of the national government, by their familiar and domestic regulations,
there would be a danger that the Union, constantly weakened by the distance and
discouragements of its functionaries, might at last become, as it was under the
confederation, a mere show, if not a mockery, of sovereignty.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 291, at 211
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891).
42. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, supra note 11, at 119 (arguing that people's "affections are
commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object"); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 39, at 292-93 (stating that the powers of state governments
"extend to all objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and
properties of the people"); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 157 (George
Lawrence trans. & J.P. Mayer ed., 1969) (1850) (stating that the "lawgivers of America" gave
"the Union money and soldiers, but the states retained the love and the prejudices of the
peoples").
43. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 39, at 290-91 (discussing the formation of the
federal government); THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 16, at 296 ("A local spirit will infallibly
prevail much more in the members of the Congress than a national spirit will prevail in the
legislatures of the particular States.").
44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 16, at 295; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, supra
note 11, at 119 (stating that the people's natural attachment will be to local government, rather
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and, when it comes to their government, "the people of any country (if,
like the Americans, intelligent and well-informed) seldom adopt and
steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting
their interests."46 Should the people desire a greater consolidation of
power in the federal government, Madison argued, "the people ought
not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where
they may discover it to be most due."47 If that means allotting the
states a lesser measure of power, then so be it:
Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed,
was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions
lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty and safety, but that
the government of the individual States ... might enjoy a certain extent of power and be
arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? ... It is too early for
politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the
great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of
government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of
this object .... [A]s far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the
happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be
sacrificed to the latter.4s
Because the people would be free to "giv[e] most of their
confidence where they may discover it to be most due," the state and
federal governments would be engaged in a competition for the
people's affection and for the regulatory power which that affection
often brings. State and federal politicians might not always regard
themselves as rivals, and citizens might not always feel greater
affection for one sovereign than they do for the other. Yet conscious
rivalries and differing levels of affection are not required for the
Framers' vision to be realized. Even if, at a given moment in time, all
politicians believe they are engaged in a cooperative effort to secure
than to the federal government, "unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much
better administration of the latter"); THE FEDERALIST No. 27, supra note 32, at 174 ("I believe it
may be laid down as a general rule that [the people's] confidence in and obedience to a
government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration.").
45. See WOOD, supra note 36, at 530-32, 545-46 (stressing that this principle comprised the
core of the Federalists' thinking).
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 41-42 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 16, at 295; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra
note 11, at 119 (suggesting that states will lose power if they fail to "administer their affairs with
uprightness and prudence").
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 39, at 289. Madison addressed the matter in more
startling fashion during the Framers' debates in Philadelphia:
Were it practicable for the Genl. Govt. to extend its care to every requisite object
without the cooperation of the State Govts. the people would not be less free as
members of one great Republic than as members of thirteen smaller ones ....
Supposing therefore a tendency in the Genl. Govt. to absorb the State Govts. no fatal
consequence could result.
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 34, at 161-62.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the common good and all citizens feel equal measures of affection for
the two governments, the potential for a future realignment of power
remains: if the people ever conclude that one sovereign is more
competent, more reliable, more efficient, or more worthy of the
people's trust than the other sovereign, they can work to redistribute
power in a manner that better mirrors the differing levels of
confidence they are willing to place in the two governments.
Of course, the Framers acknowledged, the Constitution would
prevent the people from placing all of their confidence in a single
sovereign. The Constitution limits Congress to its enumerated
powers, 49 it grants the federal government the exclusive power to
perform certain functions, 50 and it reserves for the states "certain
exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power."51 In each of
these respects, the Constitution is anticompetitive because it prevents
the people from allocating responsibility as they see fit.52 Yet with
respect to all matters that the Constitution does not commit to the
exclusive care of one sovereign or the other,53 the Framers wished to
empower citizens by reserving to them the power of choice-the power
to choose to distribute power in any way they believe serves their
interests.
Even with respect to those areas in which the Constitution
does limit the ability of a sovereign to regulate, the Framers believed
the people would play an important role. Madison conceded that "the
task of marking the proper line of partition, between the authority of
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 39, at 292.
50. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 280-83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(providing as examples the power to enter into treaties and to coin money); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that
the states "retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had," except where the
Constitution delegates power "exclusively" to the federal government).
51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(providing no examples); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that Congress would exceed its powers if it tried "to vary the law of
descent in any State" or "to abrogate a land tax imposed by the authority of a State").
52. See generally ALBERT BRETON, COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
POLITICS AND PUBLIC FINANCE 190 (1996) (stating that "constitutionally entrenched
assignments ... must ... be conceived as constraints on the competition that orders the
relationship of governments engaged in the production and provision of goods and services").
53. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 50, at 199 (stating that the power to
impose taxes "on all articles other than exports and imports ... is manifestly a concurrent and
coequal authority in the United States and in the individual States"). Hamilton elaborated:
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division of
the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not
explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor is not only a
theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of
the instrument which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution.
Id. at 201.
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the general, and that of the State Governments" had been an
"arduous" one for the Constitution's drafters, given the complexity of
the subject matter, the limitations of human faculties, and the
imprecision of words. 54 The task of defining that "proper line of
partition" would fall partially on the shoulders of legislators, who
must make an initial assessment of what they are empowered to do;
55
partially on the shoulders of executive and judicial officials, who are
called upon "to expound and give effect to the legislative acts";56 and
ultimately on the shoulders of the people, who must rectify
unconstitutional usurpations of power in any way that "the exigency
may suggest and prudence justify."57 In determining whether one
sovereign had encroached on the other's territory, the people would
"appeal to the standard they have formed"58 -a standard that is
embodied in the text of the Constitution, but that also is undoubtedly
colored (especially when the Constitution's text is not clear) by the
extent to which each sovereign has earned the people's trust and has
proved itself competent to perform desired functions.
Determining when that line-drawing task should be committed
to the judicial branch and when it should be left to overtly political
judgments is one of the chief problems of modern American
federalism.59 Regardless of who draws that line in close cases,
however, the Framers conferred upon us a system of government in
which citizens often have "a choice among political authorities" and
are able to bring their requests to whichever government they deem
best able to serve them.60 Each government is permitted to exercise
greater or lesser regulatory power over time in accordance with the
people's judgment about which government most deserves the public's
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 227-29 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
55. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 51, at 203 (stating that "the national
government, like every other, must judge in the first instance of the proper exercise of its
powers").
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 50, at 286.
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 51, at 203; cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note
34, at 117 (stating that the people are "the natural guardians of the constitution"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 31, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that
concerns about usurpation ultimately must "be left to the people, whom ... it is to be hoped will
always take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State
governments"). Ordinarily, Madison explained, the people's remedy for such usurpations would
be found at the ballot box, where citizens "can by the election of more faithful representatives,
annul the acts of the usurpers." THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 50, at 286.
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 51, at 203.
59. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
60. VINCENT OSTROM, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF A COMPOUND REPUBLIC: DESIGNING THE
AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 121 (2d ed. 1987).
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confidence. 61 Not only might federalism protect individuals' freedom
by diffusing power between two sovereigns, 62 therefore, but it also
enhances their freedom by giving them at least two governmental
options from which to choose when trying to solve public problems.
Jack Rakove summarizes the Framers' vision well:
Federalism ... involves a struggle or competition for the political allegiance and
affections of a population that has consented to be ruled simultaneously by two levels of
government. [Federalism encourages people] to express preferences as to which level
will, over time, prove more competent to provide the services and perform the duties
they desire. From its inception in the Revolutionary era, the formal structure of
American federalism has created not so much a set of mandates as a set of
possibilities .... If one treats federalism solely as a legal arrangement for dividing the
sovereign powers of government, without measuring the alternating political currents
that flow along its complicated circuitry, its essential character will remain elusive.
63
61. See DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 52-53 (1984) (stating
that, under the system described in the Federalist Papers, the scope of powers exercised by each
sovereign "will be determined by the degree to which the people are or become attached to one or
the other," that people "can elect more assertive officers to one and more restrained officers to
the other, depending on which government seems to deserve a larger role," and that the people
should not be precluded from placing their trust in whichever government seems most worthy of
that trust); Kincaid, supra note 17, at 100 (stating that the Constitution enables the federal
government to "compete directly with state governments for public esteem, tax resources, policy
supremacy, and other goods" and that this "is one of the great innovations of the U.S.
Constitution"); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 268-69 (2000) (stating that the Framers "presupposed a
durable and enduring political competition between state and federal officials"); Sandra Day
O'Connor, Testing Government Action: The Promise of Federalism, in PUBLIC VALUES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35, 39 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993) ("As to the vertical division of
government power, the Federalists intended a sort of competition between the states and the
national government, whereby the people would benefit."); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
"Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 441
(2002) ("The role of state and local governments may divide citizens' allegiance and soften
impulses to vest totalizing power in the national government.").
62. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323-25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). I
use the word "might" because scholars debate the senses in which federalism does or does not
protect individuals' freedom. Compare WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION,
SIGNIFICANCE 139-45 (1964) (arguing that there is no meaningful sense in which federalism
ensures freedom, and using slavery and the persistence of racial discrimination as examples),
and Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American Tradition:
Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 227, 233-34 (1996) (similarly
pointing to slavery and racial discrimination as examples of federalism's failures), with Massey,
supra note 2, at 440-44 (arguing that federalism promotes freedom by allowing citizens to move
to more favorable states and by preventing the concentration of power in tyrannical hands), and
Wille, supra note 19, at 1081 (making arguments comparable to those advanced by Massey).
63. Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1031, 1042 (1997).
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B. The Continuing Vitality of the Framers' Vision
There certainly are ways in which the Framers' expectations
seem plainly outdated. It is difficult to believe, for example, that state
militias could still restrain a tyrannical federal government,64 and the
Seventeenth Amendment undercuts the Framers' expectation that
state legislatures' election of Senators would give the states a powerful
means of restraining Congress. 65 Indeed, the federal government has
grown so large and powerful that it may be difficult to imagine that it
is engaged in any sort of meaningful competition with the states.
66
Yet the Framers' expectation of federal-state competition is far
from anachronistic. After all, elected officials today are surely as eager
to keep their jobs and to wield meaningful power as their counterparts
were at the time of the nation's founding. While it undoubtedly is true
that legislators often succumb to pressure from special-interest groups
to enact laws that are not in the public's best interest,67 their desire
for reelection also gives them an incentive to be perceived as meeting
their constituents' needs.6 If a sovereign's lawmakers too frequently
subordinate the needs of their constituents to the wishes of special-
interest groups, prove ineffectual in the face of public problems, waste
the people's resources, or otherwise lose the people's confidence,
citizens are presented with a choice. They can maintain the existing
allocation of power and simply vote to replace the unsatisfactory
lawmakers with more conscientious leaders, or they can conclude that
64. Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 16, at 298 ("The only refuge left for those
who prophecy the downfall of the State Governments, is the visionary supposition that the
Federal Government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. [It
is surely unnecessary] to disprove the reality of this danger."), and THE FEDERALIST No. 16,
supra note 34, at 115 (stating that the belief that the federal government would militarily
dominate the states was "little less romantic than that monster-taming spirit, which is
attributed to the fabulous heroes and demi-gods of antiquity"), with Larry Kramer,
Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1516-17 (1994) (describing such predictions
as "quaint").
65. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (stating that Senators representing each state
shall be "chosen by the Legislature thereof'), and THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 39, at 291
(assuring readers that "[t]he Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State
Legislatures"), with U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (mandating popular election of Senators).
66. See Kincaid, supra note 17, at 90.
67. See Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 340-41 (1990)
(stating that public choice theorists have taught us that the explosion of federal regulation in the
twentieth century was the result, in part, of pressure from lobbyists, rather than of a desire to
serve the public interest).
68. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 24-33 (1991) (concluding that public choice models of legislative behavior are too
simplistic if they ignore the fact that legislators are motivated by both ideology and constituent
interests); cf. Macey, supra note 7, at 265-67 (explaining that, in the eyes of public choice
theorists, legislators take those actions that will maximize their political support).
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more decisive action is needed and that power should be shifted from
one sovereign to the other. If citizens prefer the latter course-
perhaps to achieve greater economic efficiency, 69 to bypass a class of
politicians who are too easily captured by special-interest groups, 70 or
to accomplish other objectives-they can elect leaders who share their
views regarding the optimal distribution of power, bolster the
capacities of the sovereign to which they wish to shift power, and
shape public opinion through such means as advertising and public
demonstrations.
71
Although it rarely is employed in scholarly and judicial
writings on federalism, the Framers' vision of federal-state
competition thus remains a powerful tool for making descriptive
observations about American politics. 72 Democrats and Republicans,
69. See, e.g., WILLIAM ANDERSON, THE NATION AND THE STATES, RIVALS OR PARTNERS? 149
(1955) (stating that, "[o]n grounds of greater efficiency," one level of government may be better
suited than another to perform a given function); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism
and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 556 (1994)
(arguing that federal regulation of commerce is appropriate only when "state regulation of
commerce would be inefficient due to the presence of externalities"); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.,
Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 141 (1997)
(stating that decentralization is undesirable if it frustrates efforts to achieve economies of scale).
70. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 67, at 340 (arguing that federal lawmaking processes
"invite the very domination by faction that Madison so desired to prevent"); Keith E.
Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural Foundations of
Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 508-10 (1998) (stating that some prefer
decentralization because they believe federal politicians are too responsive to special-interest
groups).
71. See BRETON, supra note 52, at 48-49; see also ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 16-17, 34 (1970)
(explaining that dissatisfied consumers often have "exit options" and "voice options"; that
economists tend to believe exit is the most powerful means of expressing unhappiness; and that,
when exit is not a viable alternative, "voice must carry the entire burden of alerting management
to its failings").
72. In addition to those features of American politics noted above, competition between
state and federal officials also may be seen in citizens' use of what Albert Breton calls the
"Salmon mechanism." BRETON, supra note 52, at 189. Pierre Salmon argues that citizens make
comparative assessments of government leaders even if those leaders serve different
jurisdictions. Pierre Salmon, Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme, 3 OXFORD REV. OF ECON.
POL'Y 24, 31-35 (1987). Breton summarizes Salmon's insight as follows:
Citizens use the information they acquire about the supply performance of one or
more benchmark governments to appraise and evaluate the supply performance of
their own governments. Opposition parties, therefore, have ready-made platforms,
based on the same information as that of their citizens, from which to challenge
incumbent governments.
BRETON, supra note 52, at 189. When former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani was widely
praised for his handling of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, for example, he
established a performance benchmark for government leaders across the country faced with
crises. Citizens easily make such performance comparisons across the federal-state divide. When
he imposed a moratorium in 2000 on executions pending a study of his state's system of capital
punishment, for example, Illinois Governor George Ryan prompted federal legislators to consider
346
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for example, continue to distinguish themselves from one another, at
least in part, by the different ways in which they would allocate power
between the state and federal governments.7 3 Similarly, there are
countless ongoing debates concerning whether regulatory control over
specific matters should reside in state or federal hands.74 There also
are areas in which one sovereign's legislative activity may best be
explained by that sovereign's eagerness to mimic the popular activity
of its competitor. v5
ways of decreasing the likelihood that innocent persons will be executed. See Wayne Washington,
217 Back a House DNA Bill in Capital Case, U.S. to Help Pay for Test, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19,
2002, at A3 (reporting that federal politicians believe that "Ryan's stand in Illinois has provided
the biggest boost for changes in the death penalty"); see also Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issue of
Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 1 (reporting
that Governor Ryan "commuted all Illinois death sentences [on January 11, 2003] to prison
terms of life or less"). Governor Ryan established a performance benchmark, in other words, and
other politicians are striving to ensure that the public does not judge them harshly in light of it.
73. In the 2000 presidential campaign, for example, the Democrats stressed the need for an
active federal presence in a wide range of domestic areas. See THE 2000 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
PLATFORM: PROSPERITY, PROGRESS, AND PEACE, at http://www.democrats.org/-
about/platform.html (last visited May 15, 2002) (on file with author). The Republicans also
outlined areas in which federal action was needed, but devoted a portion of their platform to the
Tenth Amendment and to the need "to shift power from Washington back to the states." See
REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2000: RENEWING AMERICA'S PURPOSE. TOGETHER, at
http://www.rnc.org/gopinfo/platform (last visited May 15, 2002) (on file with author).
74. Consider, for example, the debate about physician-assisted suicide. Under the Oregon
Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (2001), physicians may prescribe
medications to help certain patients take their own lives. The Bush Administration has
concluded that the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (2000), prohibits
prescribing medications for that purpose. Oregon v. Rasmussen, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1078-84
(D. Or. 2002) (describing Oregon's dispute with the Bush Administration). Although the
Rasmussen court rejected the Administration's interpretation of the federal statute, Congress
undoubtedly will consider legislation that would unambiguously ban physicians from prescribing
drugs for the purpose of helping their patients to commit suicide. Cf. id. at 1092-93 (noting that
earlier attempts to amend the federal statute failed). By electing politicians who share their
views, voters both in Oregon and nationwide can decide whether this is a matter for state or
federal determination.
75. Consider, for example, the increasing federalization of criminal law. In recent years,
Congress has criminalized an ever widening array of conduct-conduct that, in many instances,
was already proscribed by state law. See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New
Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979,
997-98 (1995); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief- The Federalization of American Criminal
Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1162 (1995); see also George D. Brown, Constitutionalizing the
Federal Criminal Law Debate: Morrison, Jones, and the ABA, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 983 (discussing
constitutional and jurisdictional issues relating to federalization of the criminal law). Federal
criminal statutes may now be found for such things as murder, carjacking, domestic violence,
assault, theft, robbery, embezzlement, extortion, fraud, arson, bribery, drug trafficking and
possession, and firearms offenses. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of
Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 654-55 (1997) (citing the relevant statutes). Moreover, the
sentences for federal convictions tend to be significantly longer than those for state convictions.
See Beale, supra, at 998.
Why has Congress created an overlay of federal criminal law under which penalties are
generally stiffer than those under state law? It is not because the states were widely perceived as
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:329
While the battle for affection sometimes pits one government
against the other in a struggle for power-unless revenues are
somehow shared, for example, a dollar paid to one sovereign in taxes
is a dollar that cannot be paid to the other sovereign 76-it is not
always so. Sometimes the two sovereigns believe they can best accrue
political support by joining forces in a cooperative effort to secure the
common good. 77 On other occasions, a government might seek the
people's affection by withdrawing from a regulatory arena and ceding
being soft on crime. See, e.g., Brickey, supra, at 1159-61 (arguing that the states were effectively
enforcing their drug laws prior to Congress's decision to enact largely duplicative laws). Rather,
federal politicians have been eavesdropping on Alexander Hamilton, who told the states they
would have a significant competitive advantage over the federal government because they would
be the primary "guardian[s] of life and property." See THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 11, at
120. By seeking to join the states as the people's local guardian, Congress hopes to win a greater
measure of affection for itself. When Congress banned the possession of guns near schools in the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. §
922(q)(2)(A) (2000), for example, it was not meeting a pressing public need-more than forty
states had already banned the possession of guns in or near schools. See United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Presumably, Congress enacted that
legislation because it hoped to score the same kinds of political points that local officials hope to
score when they "get tough on crime." See generally Brickey, supra, at 1165 (stating that, in
federalizing the criminal law, Congress has proven unable to resist "the all too irresistible urge
to do something politically popular").
76. Cf. John Shannon & James E. Kee, The Rise of Competitive Federalism, 9 PUB.
BUDGETING & FIN. 5, 7 (1989). Shannon and Kee state:
Washington policymakers as well as state and local officials must go back, hat-in-
hand, to a common source-the nation's taxpayers-when additional tax revenue is
needed .... [T]here is growing evidence that absent a national crisis, Washington
does not have the inside track in the emerging intergovernmental race for taxpayer
support.
Id.
77. In the decade immediately following the Constitution's ratification, for example, federal
and state authorities launched cooperative efforts in a number of areas, such as enforcing the
states' quarantine laws, licensing auctioneers, housing prisoners, and using the states' courts to
enforce federal laws. See FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT 4 (1978) [hereinafter FEDERAL-
STATE RELATIONS]. As time passed, that spirit of cooperation also manifested itself in other
areas. The federal government frequently granted cash and land to the states in the late 1700s
and the 1800s, for example, but attached increasingly specific conditions to those grants, such as
the requirement that the property be used for public education. See id. at 12-16. The federal and
state governments often exchanged expertise during times of crisis, and state and local officials
worked with the Army Corps of Engineers on a wide range of projects. See Daniel J. Elazar, The
Scope of Cooperation, in AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: FOUNDATIONS,
PERSPECTIVES, AND ISSUES 36, 37-40 (Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr. ed., 1985) [hereinafter AMERICAN
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS]. Although many of these early cooperative arrangements were
primarily administrative in nature, by the time of the New Deal the two sovereigns' cooperative
undertakings had taken on a decidedly regulatory cast, with the federal government thereby
extending its reach into a wide range of areas that previously had been controlled exclusively by
the states. For a discussion of the transition to the New Deal era, see infra notes 83-90 and
accompanying text.
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power to its competitor. 78 Regardless of whether lawmakers ever
pursue such strategies for the very purpose of improving their
standing in the federal-state competition for affection, their actions
necessarily have competitive implications: the more affection a
sovereign earns, the more difficult it becomes for its competitor to
persuade citizens that a power-shift is desirable.
The continued relevance of the Framers' vision is perhaps best
illustrated by the macrolevel shifts in popular sentiment and in
regulatory power that have occurred over the course of the nation's
history. Until the late 1800s, the federal-state competition played out
much as the Framers predicted. Hamilton and Madison had argued
that state politicians would command a greater measure of the
people's loyalty than federal politicians and that, as a result,
responsibility for securing the public good would fall primarily on the
states' shoulders. 79 In the nation's first century, the states were indeed
the source of nearly all legislation that was of any consequence to the
American public. 0 Professor Rakove exaggerates only slightly when
he writes that, during this period, "the business of the national
government was reduced to collecting some duties, delivering the mail
(albeit on Sunday, at least for a while), and governing western
territories."8 1  The American people wanted a small federal
government, and that is what they got.8 2
After the Civil War, however, political pressure for a more
active federal government grew as the nation's economy shifted from
agrarian to industrial, as businesses sought to exploit nationwide
markets, as citizens crowded into the nation's cities and tried to secure
78. Jonathan Macey has pointed out, for example, that Congress often can maximize its
political support by deferring to state and local regulators when federal regulation would
undermine a state's widely valued regulatory assets (such as Delaware's body of corporate law),
when different regions strongly prefer different regulatory outcomes, and when Congress can
avoid damaging attacks from special-interest groups by shifting responsibility to state and local
officials. See Macey, supra note 7, at 267-69, 276-90.
79. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
80. See Scheiber, supra note 62, at 234-35 (stating that, prior to 1861, "family law, criminal
law, business organization law, labor law (including slavery), inheritance, local government
organization, education at all levels, even much of the relationship of religious organizations to
the state, and other areas of social and economic ordering ... all were largely or entirely in the
hands of state governments").
81. Rakove, supra note 63, at 1042.
82. See Shannon & Kee, supra note 76, at 7 (stating that, from 1789 to 1929, "the public
voiced and voted its preference for small government in general and a very small federal
domestic presence in particular"). Barry Weingast explains that, prior to the 1930s, "[a] national
consensus supported the limited role of the federal government. Because this view was so widely
held, all the major parties before the 1930s championed it .. " Barry R. Weingast, The
Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic
Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 19 (1995).
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favorable treatment from their increasingly powerful employers, and
as numerous state officials refused to honor the civil rights conferred
by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
8 3
Congress responded by attempting to enforce the Civil War
Amendments,8 4 conferring federal-question jurisdiction on federal
district courts,8 5 and enacting the Interstate Commerce Act of 188786
and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890.87 Congress further extended
the federal government's reach during the Great Depression, as a
popular president pushed through New Deal programs on matters
ranging from entitlements, to agriculture, to the terms and conditions
of employment, to transportation, and more.88 By the time the
Supreme Court finally gave this expanded federal role its blessing,8 9 it
was clear that the public supported a broad shift of power to the
nation's capital.90
The years following the New Deal were not happy ones for the
states. As William Riker noted at the time, there had been a "gradual
transfer of patriotism from state to nation."91 This shift was prompted
in part by the widespread public perception that state governments
were corrupt, inept, and inefficient. 92 Shortly after serving as North
83. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 117-19 (1987) (concisely
describing these events); Keith Werhan, Checking Congress and Balancing Federalism: A Lesson
from Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1213, 1242-44 (2000) (tying
these developments to Madison's acknowledgment in Federalist No. 46 that the people might one
day prefer federal regulation).
84. See generally Todd E. Pettys, The Intended Relationship Between Administrative
Regulations and Section 1983"s "Laws", 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 54-60 (1998) (describing the
evolution of early civil rights legislation).
85. See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2000)).
86. See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (2000)).
87. See Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)).
88. See Scheiber, supra note 62, at 257-59; see also id. at 261 (stating that President
Roosevelt pointed to his "enormous electoral majorities" as evidence of "an overwhelming
mandate for change" in the nation's governance structure) (internal quotation omitted).
89. See, e.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
90. See GREVE, supra note 9, at 21 ('The lesson of 1937 is that the Court cannot enforce
constitutional norms against the will of the country and against Congress."); cf. ANDERSON,
supra note 69, at 142 (arguing that there was "nothing to be gained except injured toes by
kicking against the necessity of our times for large-scale government").
91. RIKER, supra note 62, at 105; accord Whittington, supra note 70, at 500 (asserting that
the states lost "much of their moral authority as representatives of the people, and popular
allegiance shifted to the national government").
92. See IRA SHARKANSKY, THE MALIGNED STATES: POLICY ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROBLEMS,
AND OPPORTUNITIES 1-2 (1972) (defending the states against the common charge that they were
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Carolina's governor in the early 1960s, for example, Terry Sanford
wrote that the states had "lost their confidence, and the people their
faith in the states."93 The shift was also encouraged by broad public
approval of Congress's regulatory activity. Congress created popular
"large-scale education, welfare, and environmental programs," for
example, and secured the states' assistance in implementing them.94
In taking those actions, the federal government claimed a sizable
percentage of the nation's limited tax revenues, thereby "squeez[ing]
out the revenue raising capacities of states and localities" and causing
the states to be increasingly dependent on federal financial support.95
Yet this appeared to be what the American people wanted. Public
opinion surveys indicated, for example, that when asked which
government made the best use of its money, more people placed the
federal government strongly in first, with local government second,
and state government a distant third.96
By the time Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980, the
tide had begun to shift once again in ways that continue to be felt
today. People had grown increasingly concerned about the federal
government's penchant for deficit spending and had come to believe
that federal programs often create more problems than they solve and
that lobbyists too frequently have federal officials within their grasp. 97
"habitats of corrupt, evil, or simply ineffective politicians and bureaucrats"); RICHARD S.
WILLIAMSON: REAGAN'S FEDERALISM: His EFFORTS TO DECENTRALIZE GOVERNMENT 221 (1990)
(stating that, after World War II, "[s]tates were.., characterized as corrupt, and ignorant of
social needs").
93. TERRY SANFORD, STORM OVER THE STATES 21 (1967). Sanford attributed this drop in the
public's confidence to a variety of factors, including neglected cities, environmental concerns that
transcended state boundaries, benighted tax policies, stifling state constitutions, weak
governorships, and state legislators who were too quick to succumb to lobbyists and too slow to
reapportion representation to match population shifts. Id. at 22-38.
94. Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 577 (2000); see
also Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the
Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1695 (2001) ("Starting most notably with the
environmental protection statutes passed in the 1970s, federal regulatory programs increasingly
have relied on state agencies to implement federal law.").
95. WILLIAMSON, supra note 92, at 221. Even today, federal disbursements comprise nearly
thirty percent of all state revenue. Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora's Box of Federalism: The
Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 461-62
(2002).
96. In 1972, for example, 39% of surveyed individuals chose the federal government, 26%
chose local government, and 18% chose state government, with the balance expressing no
opinion. Those numbers had not significantly changed by 1976, when 36% chose the federal
government, 25% chose local government, and 20% chose state government. ADVISORY COMM'N
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON GOVERNMENT AND TAXES
2 (1976) (providing survey results for the years 1972 through 1976 and stating that the federal
government was "the clear public opinion winner").
97. See Robert B. Hawkins, Jr., American Federalism: Again at the Crossroads, in
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR THE REPUBLIC 3, 8-10 (Robert B. Hawkins, Jr.
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The states, meanwhile, had revitalized themselves by improving their
tax systems, professionalizing their staffs, and strengthening their
governors' powers. 95 Not surprisingly, when asked today which
government makes the best use of its funds, citizens place both local
and state government ahead of the federal government. 99 The result
has been two decades of political and scholarly conversation about
devolving power to state and local governments. 100 (Consider, for
example, the 1996 welfare reform legislation, which provided states
with increased flexibility in the distribution of federally funded
welfare benefits. 101) While scholars debate the impact of some of these
devolution initiatives, 10 2 there is no question that the public's
changing sentiments are continuing to shape the nation's legislative
agenda.
History clearly suggests, therefore, that the state and federal
governments continue to compete for supremacy in the public's eyes
and that citizens have favored changes in the distribution of
regulatory power when they have judged it to be in their best interest.
Such shifts may reflect broad-based disenchantment with or affection
for one sovereign or the other, or they may reflect a narrower
judgment that one sovereign is more likely than the other to regulate
specific areas of concern in a satisfactory manner. These shifts in
ed., 1982); Whittington, supra note 70, at 506-10; see also Shannon & Kee, supra note 76, at 13
(stating that Reagan articulated the public's growing dissatisfaction with always looking to
Washington for solutions to the nation's problems).
98. See ALICE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE STATES &
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 102-07 (1992); Shannon & Kee, supra note 76, at 13-16; Whittington,
supra note 70, at 516-22. Michael Greve notes that, in recent years, state and local governments
"have become more confident, more assertive, more resistant to federal micro-management, and
more vocal in demanding authority and flexibility in administering federal programs." GREVE,
supra note 9, at 104.
99. See Richard L. Cole & John Kincaid, Public Opinion and American Federalism:
Perspectives on Taxes, Spending and Trust, 74 SPECTRUM: THE JOURNAL OF STATE GOVERNMENT
No. 3, at 14 (2001); cf. Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: Some Reflections on the Federalism Debate,
14 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3 n.7 (1996) (stating that surveys indicate a higher level of trust in state
government than in the federal government).
100. For a lengthy discussion of the various devolution proposals, see TIMOTHY CONLAN,
FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM
passim (1998). For a brief discussion of the same topic, see Greve, supra note 94, at 578-84. Most
recently, President George W. Bush has concluded that he can win public support by reducing
the extent of federal involvement in a wide range of areas, prompting states to scramble to fill
perceived gaps in such areas as antitrust, health care, product safety, and environmental
protection. Stephen Labaton, States Seek to Counter U.S. Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2002, at A23.
101. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
102. See Richard L. Cole et al., Devolution: Where's the Revolution?, 29 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM 99, 99-100 (1999).
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sentiment and power do not always occur quickly-they may be more
akin to the turns of an ocean freighter than to those of a speedboat-
but they do occur.
There is no guarantee, however, that the state and federal
governments will remain viable competitors against one another or
that citizens will remain able to allocate power between the two
sovereigns in ways they deem advantageous. Indeed, there are several
ways in which the federal-state marketplace might falter. It is to these
important matters that I devote the balance of this Article.
III. MARKET FAILURE AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
A. An Overview of the Terrain
Beginning in the late 1960s, a small group of economists
developed a new way of thinking about competition and monopoly
power. Under the traditional model of perfect competition, the
market's invisible hand can be relied upon to push prices to
competitive, welfare-maximizing levels only if there is a large number
of sellers, so that no single seller can cause prices to rise by cutting its
own production. 10 3 Proponents of the theory of contestable markets
suggested, however, that prices could come to rest at competitive
levels even in a market populated by a single seller. 10 4 This would be
true, these economists argued, if the seller continually operated under
the threat that other sellers might quickly enter the market and sell
the same product or service at a lower price. 105
Although it has failed to revolutionize the way in which
economists and regulators approach problems of dominance in the
private marketplace, 10 6 the theory of contestable markets provides a
103. See HERB HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 3, 8 (2d ed. 1999).
104. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE passim (1982) (providing one of the leading discussions of the theory of
contestable markets); Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of
Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111 passim (1984) (providing a more concise discussion
of the same theory); Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 passim (1968)
(arguing that competitive forces may prevail even in industries having only one or a small
number of sellers).
105. See BAUMOL, supra note 104, at 5-6; Bailey & Baumol, supra note 104, at 113. On this
view, the goal of government regulation should not be to limit the size or maximize the number
of sellers, or to regulate prices, but rather to eliminate or mitigate those factors that make
quickly entering and exiting markets costly. See BAUMOL, supra note 104, at 477-83.
106. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 103, at 36 (stating that the theory may prove to be a "flash
in the pan" because "[t]he minimum conditions for contestability ... must obtain very strictly,




useful analogy for beginning to think about the ways in which the
marketplace of federal-state competition might fail. If one sovereign
assumes a position of regulatory dominance and the other sovereign
falls so far out of favor with the American people that it ceases to be
regarded as a viable regulatory alternative, at least two related
misfortunes likely will ensue. First, the people will be deprived of one
of the benefits that federalism was intended to confer-namely,
governmental alternatives on all issues that the Constitution does not
commit to the exclusive care of one sovereign or the other.107 Second,
at least until it too loses the public's trust, the dominant sovereign will
be free to abuse its power and to disregard the public interest without
fear that it will lose power to the disfavored sovereign.
Suppose that the mechanisms of the federal-state marketplace
do break down, perhaps in one of the ways that I shall describe in a
moment-where might one turn for a remedy? The judiciary is one
candidate, and it is on recent instances of judicial intervention that I
shall largely focus. Yet one must take a long, careful look through the
peephole before inviting the courts through the federalism door.
108
Just as they should be reluctant to intervene in markets in other
settings, 109  courts should be especially reluctant to find that
legislation-although enacted pursuant to the requisite formalities-is
unconstitutional because it either creates or is the product of a flawed
political marketplace.110 As a matter of institutional competence,
107. See supra notes 30-63 and accompanying text (describing the Framers' vision).
108. See generally Kramer, supra note 61, at 293 ("Supporters of judicial intervention [in
federalism disputes] have a greater burden than they seem to realize if they want to make their
position legally and intellectually respectable."); David S. Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing
Protected Class: Reflections on Reverse Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Racial Balancing,
2000 Wis. L. REV. 657, 685 ("A broad legal consensus has long held that judicial intervention in
the political process ... requires a substantial burden of justification in the form of strong
reasons to mistrust the political branches' ability to resolve the issue.").
109. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 257, 273 ("[The basic rule [in antitrust cases] should be nonintervention
unless the tribunal has a high degree of confidence that it has identified anticompetitive
behavior and can apply an effective remedy."); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics
as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648 (1998)
("'Where there is an appropriately robust market in partisan competition, there is less
justification for judicial intervention [in election-law cases]."); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 682 (1979) (arguing that courts and legislatures "should attempt to
ascertain whether noncompetitive behavior is occurring in the relevant [consumer] market before
intervening").
110. Under the Equal Protection Clause, for example, the Court usually is extremely
reluctant to declare legislation unconstitutional absent an indication that the legislation
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or discriminates against a person who is a
member of a group that historically has been excluded from the political process. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 643-49 (2d ed. 2002); LAURENCE
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courts are not inevitably better suited than the political branches to
identify and repair failings in the political process. 1 ' Moreover, if
courts too readily accept invitations to declare legislation the ill-
begotten progeny of a malfunctioning political market, they risk
usurping the value-identifying and policymaking functions that the
political branches of government are intended to serve." 2 Indeed,
there has long been a debate about whether the courts are ever an
appropriate forum for resolving federalism disputes. Some have taken
the position that the states' interests are sufficiently protected by
structural features of American politics, 113 while others have argued
that the courts play a vital role in maintaining our federal system of
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1012 (1978). With respect to discrimination against
members of politically disadvantaged groups, John Hart Ely describes a leading rationale for
judicial intervention:
The approach to constitutional adjudication recommended here is akin to what might
be called an "antitrust" as opposed to a "regulatory" orientation to economic affairs-
rather than dictate substantive results it intervenes only when the "market," in our
case the political market, is systematically malfunctioning .... Our government
cannot fairly be said to be "malfunctioning" simply because it sometimes generates
outcomes with which we disagree .... Malfunction occurs when the process is
undeserving of trust ....
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 102-03 (1980); see
also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (famously suggesting that
legislation that discriminates against "discrete and insular minorities" might warrant "more
searching judicial inquiry," because those minorities cannot rely on the political process for their
protection).
111. See Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for
Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 398-425 (1984) (arguing against the
presupposition that the judiciary is always best suited to fix malfunctions of the political
process); cf. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 106 (1988) (stating that "the political process is enormously complex" and that judges asked
to diagnose failings in that process are confronted with a wide array of conflicting views from
which to choose); Richard L. Hasen, The "Political Market" Metaphor and Election Law: A
Comment on Issacharoff and Pildes, 50 STAN. L. REV. 719, 730 (1998) (stating that courts lack "a
yardstick for measuring appropriate political competition either between party and nonparty
political actors or among nonparty actors").
112. See TUSHNET, supra note 111, at 70-83 (1988) (arguing that representation-
reinforcement theories of judicial review are flawed because, by inviting courts to rectify a broad
range of formal and informal failings in the political process, they leave judges insufficiently
constrained).
113. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 175-81 (1980) (arguing
that structural features of the federal government render federalism issues nonjusticiable);
Kramer, supra note 61, at 278-91 (arguing that political parties protect the states from federal
overreaching and that courts should apply a highly deferential standard of review to claims that
Congress has intruded upon matters reserved to the states). All such arguments inevitably trace
their lineage to Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
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government. 114 The Court itself has vacillated between those two
camps.1
1 5
Thus far, however, the participants in that debate have focused
primarily on the federal and state governments' structural
interconnections and have ignored the dynamics of the larger
marketplace for citizens' allegiance. 116 Yet until we understand the
requirements of that marketplace, it is premature to make
declarations about the judiciary's role in preserving federalism. We
cannot know whether courts, the political branches, or other forces are
best suited to correct the federal-state marketplace's failings, in other
words, until we understand the forms in which those failings might
appear.
I will therefore begin to identify the conditions that must be
met if the federal and state governments are to compete with one
another in the way that the Framers envisioned. After briefly
describing three such conditions, I argue that the Court has placed
itself on a path aimed at ensuring that the requirements of the
federal-state marketplace are met. As I explained at the outset, my
objective here is not to prove that judicial intervention in each of the
Court's recent federalism cases was unassailably proper or that the
Court selected the best analytic tools for the task. We might even
ultimately reach the ironic conclusion that, although the Rehnquist
Court should be credited with helping to refocus our attention on
federal-state competition, the judiciary itself is not competent to
manage that marketplace in all of the ways that the Court currently
envisions. By identifying an overarching market-based rationale for
the Court's actions, however, I hope to provide an analytic framework
that will revitalize the debate about the dynamics and requirements of
federalism and the judiciary's role in preserving the constitutional
scheme.
114. See, e.g., Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 847, 849 (1979) (arguing that the judiciary plays an important role in resolving
federalism disputes because the states today are less able to protect their own interests);
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism
Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2001) (rejecting "the theory that because the states are
represented in the national political process, judicial review of federalism questions is either
unnecessary or unwarranted").
115. See supra notes 1, 26 (citing cases in which the Court has manifested varying degrees of
interest in adjudicating federalism disputes).
116. For a rare exception to this pattern, see Rakove, supra note 63, at 1050 (stating that
opponents and proponents of the Constitution acknowledged that "[j]udicial review of
legislation-whether national or state-would be important principally as it affected federalism,
and as it regulated the competition for political influence and loyalty that the Constitution would
inspire").
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B. The Market's Requirements
At least three requirements must be met if the federal and
state governments are to compete with one another for affection and
power. 117 I briefly identify those requirements here and then elaborate
on them more fully in the section that follows.
1. A Proving Ground
The first requirement for robust competition between the state
and federal governments is a proving ground on which each sovereign
is assured an opportunity to demonstrate its competence to the
American people. Consider the following argument: A sovereign
cannot effectively compete for citizens' trust if it has no means of
persuading them that it deserves that trust; a sovereign cannot
persuade citizens that it deserves their trust unless it has some means
of demonstrating the competent manner in which it would handle that
trust; and a sovereign cannot demonstrate its competence unless it
possesses some meaningful measure of regulatory power. This is
precisely the kind of reasoning that animated Hamilton's insistence
that the federal government have an opportunity to "attract to its
support those passions which have the strongest influence upon the
human heart" by regulating directly rather than through state
intermediaries: If a sovereign is deprived of the chance to regulate
matters of concern to its constituents, it cannot make a powerful claim
to those constituents' affection. 118
Suppose, for example, that the Commerce Clause were read so
broadly that the federal government possessed the power to deprive
the states of all regulatory opportunities and that Congress fully
117. There is a fourth apparent requirement. For the Framers' vision of federal-state
competition to work, citizens must be able to elect officials to positions of leadership in at least
one of the two sovereigns who will be responsive to the public's demands. If narrowly focused
special-interest groups succeed in capturing only one sovereign's officials by persuading those
officials to adopt laws that violate the wishes of a majority of citizens, the situation is bad but not
irremediable-the people can attempt to respond by shifting power to the sovereign that remains
responsive to their desires, thereby placing pressure on the captured sovereign to mend its ways.
But if special-interest groups so fully capture officials representing both sovereigns that the
wishes of the majority are ignored no matter where power is placed and no matter whom citizens
vote into office, then the people are deprived of the electoral opportunity to attach consequences
to their judgment that the existing distribution of power is not serving their interests. To give
these problems an appropriate measure of attention, one must delve into such matters as public
choice theory and direct democracy regulatory options (such as initiatives and referendums).
Given the length of any satisfactory discussion of these issues, they must be reserved for
treatment elsewhere.
118. See THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note 34, at 116; see also supra notes 30-63 and
accompanying text (recounting the Framers' arguments).
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exercised that power. How could the states persuade the people to
strip significant power from Washington and invest it in the states?
State leaders certainly could describe how they would handle certain
matters, could point out the ways in which the federal government is
failing to serve the public interest, and could push for the election of
federal officials who would cede power back to the states. Those state
leaders, however, would have roughly the same credibility as the
newcomer to politics who, although lacking any sort of track record in
elective office, seeks election to a position of high responsibility-such
campaigns occasionally culminate in success, but the odds are stacked
against them. The problem would be compounded if the reason power
had swung so decisively to the federal government in the first place is
that people had lost their confidence in the states: the states' problem
then would not be that they lacked a track record, but rather that they
were saddled with a terrible one. To compete effectively for allegiance
and power, therefore, a government must have the opportunity to
create regulatory success stories in areas that genuinely matter to the
people and then to urge the people to give it the opportunity to
replicate those successes in a broader range of settings. Thus arises a
paradox: To ensure that the people are well served in the long run by
competition between two viable sovereigns, each government must be
guaranteed a certain measure of power no matter how poorly it fares
as a competitor in the short run.119
2. Autonomy
The second requirement for competition between the states and
the federal government is that each sovereign must enjoy a significant
measure of autonomy from the other. Of course, the two sovereigns
cannot be entirely autonomous; there are a variety of ways in which
they are interconnected, such that one sovereign is able to influence
the other's decisionmaking.' 20 (Indeed, one way to protect the integrity
of the federal-state marketplace is to ensure that the sovereigns are
119. Cf. Shannon & Kee, supra note 76, at 18 (stating that, if they are to compete with the
federal government for limited tax revenues, the states must retain "control of those
governmental programs that most directly impact voters/taxpayers where they live and work,
e.g., education and police protection"); John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism
in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 27, 32 (1998) (arguing that judicial review of federalism disputes is
necessary in order to ensure that the states, by regulating meaningful aspects of people's lives,
will have the popular support necessary to resist a tyrannical federal government).
120. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-54 (1985)
(describing the formal ways in which the states play a role in the composition and workings of
the federal government); Kramer, supra note 61, at 278-85 (describing the emergence of political
parties and other informal mechanisms that render the state and federal governments
interconnected).
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able to make full use of those interconnections to safeguard their
respective interests. 121) Yet there must be meaningful limits on the
extent to which the sovereigns are able to control one another's
behavior. As Lewis Kaden has observed, the very notion of
"sovereignty" denotes "a power to make choices-about how to use
public monies and direct public attention, and about how to vary the
choices as the needs of the community change." 122 If the sovereigns are
genuinely to compete for the people's affection, each must enjoy a
broad measure of freedom to select those avenues by which it will try
to earn that affection, as well as to decide how to spend its limited
resources in that quest. To put it somewhat differently, each sovereign
must have significant control over the conduct that earns it a
reputation among the citizenry. If one sovereign is permitted to
control the other's tactical decisions about how to earn the people's
trust, then there is no true competition between them.
3. Transparency
The third requirement for federal-state competition is a level of
systemic transparency sufficient to enable the people to determine
which sovereign has earned their trust for regulating any given
121. As Herbert Wechsler pointed out nearly half a century ago, as the Court later
acknowledged in Garcia, and as Larry Kramer has more recently stressed, participation in
federal politics provides the states with their primary opportunity to protect themselves from
burdensome federal action. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-57 & n.l (citing Wechsler, supra note
113); Kramer, supra note 61, at 252-68. This participation undoubtedly plays an important role
in shaping federal-state competition, particularly as a force for tempering the advantages that
the Supremacy Clause confers on the federal government. See infra note 138 (noting the power of
the Supremacy Clause). By demanding that federal law be made pursuant to the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure" set forth in the Constitution, INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983), for example, the Court ensures that federal statutes have to survive
what William Eskridge and Jenna Bednar describe as the federal lawmaking "gauntlet": At each
step along the way, the states are afforded an opportunity to exert powerful lobbying forces. See
Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path: A Theory of
Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1485 (1995); see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 7 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States .... "); Clinton
v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436-41 (1998) (holding that the line-item veto violates the
Presentment Clause); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958-59 (holding that the one-house veto violates the
Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements). Yet there are aspects of current
lawmaking doctrine that seem at odds with the notion that the states always can adequately
protect their interests through the political process. Under the Spending Clause, for example,
Congress remains free to extract wide-ranging concessions from the states in exchange for the
federal funds on which states have become increasingly dependent. See South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 206-11 (1987); see also infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text (discussing the
Spending Clause). When space permits, it will be important to explore the implications of the
Framers' vision of federal-state competition for these and related matters.
122. Kaden, supra note 114, at 851.
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subject matter at any given time. The primary purpose of vertical
competition, as the Framers envisioned it, is to enable citizens to
distribute regulatory power in the manner that best serves their
interests. If one sovereign is permitted to obscure its role in bringing
about undesirable regulatory outcomes, or if political responsibility is
otherwise veiled to such an extent that the people cannot accurately
allocate blame and praise between the two governments, then the
competition's chief purpose has been thwarted. Although this
requirement is perhaps the most obvious, it is also-for reasons I
explain below123-perhaps the most problematic.
C. The Recent Record of Judicial Intervention
The Rehnquist Court has never expressly developed a theory of
federal-state competition. When the requirements of the federal-state
marketplace are placed side-by-side with the Court's recent rulings in
cases concerning the Commerce Clause, intergovernmental
immunities, and the states' sovereign immunity,' 24 however, there is a
remarkable correspondence between them. Each of those decisions
may be construed as an effort to protect the federal-state marketplace
and thereby to ensure that the states will be able to compete
effectively with the federal government for the people's affection.
1. To Ensure a Proving Ground
In United States v. Lopez 125 and United States v. Morrison,126
the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and the
civil-remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,
respectively, primarily on the strength of its insistence that the
Constitution requires a distinction "between what is truly national
and what is truly local."'127 Yet the Court did little to explain the
importance of that distinction. In Lopez, the Court merely emphasized
123. See infra notes 207-50 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 1 (citing the Court's recent federalism rulings). Because these cases are
familiar to most readers, my descriptions of their facts and holdings will be exceedingly brief.
125. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
126. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
127. See id. at 617-18 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568). In Lopez, the Court held that Congress
exceeded its power to regulate interstate commerce when it enacted the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000), which
made it a crime to possess a firearm near a school. 514 U.S. at 568. In Morrison, the Court held
that Congress exceeded its commerce power when it enacted the civil-remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), which allowed a person injured
by gender-motivated violence to bring an action for damages against the perpetrator. 529 U.S. at
627.
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that Congress is limited to its enumerated powers and that the very
notion of enumeration requires that some areas of regulatory
concern-such as certain matters relating to family law and
education-be beyond Congress's reach. 128 In Morrison, the Court
relied heavily on Lopez's analytic framework 129 and concluded that
"[tihe regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in
interstate commerce has always been the province of the States."1 30 In
both cases, the Court stopped short of denying that, when taken in the
aggregate, violence (whether committed near schools or motivated by
gender) substantially affects national productivity and interstate
travel. 131 Yet the Court refused to sustain the statutes, fearing that to
rule otherwise would be tantamount to allowing Congress to regulate
all forms of human activity. 132 Instead, the Court announced that,
while the Commerce Clause does authorize Congress to regulate
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, it does so only
if those activities are economic or commercial in nature.1 33
If a reasonable legislator could indeed find that such violence
substantially affects interstate commerce, why would the Court insist
on concluding that Congress cannot proscribe it?134 Justice Souter
attributed the majority's insistence to "a new animating theory that
makes categorical federalism seem useful again." 13 5 A more satisfying
answer might be found in a theory that is not new at all-only
128. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 ("We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a
Federal Government of enumerated powers."); id. at 564-68 (emphasizing that the Constitution
places certain areas of human activity beyond Congress's reach).
129. See 529 U.S. at 607-13 (recounting the Court's reasoning in Lopez).
130. Id. at 618.
131. See id. at 615; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64. Indeed, in both cases, four Justices believed
Congress should have been permitted to regulate on the strength of those causal chains. See
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-36 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing extensive evidence that violence
against women affects interstate commerce); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a rational legislator easily could conclude that violence in schools affects interstate
commerce).
132. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
133. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 ("Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 ("[The statute under review] is a
criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.").
134. Although Justice Thomas believes "that the very notion of a 'substantial effects' test
under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress's powers
and with this Court's early Commerce Clause cases," Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J.,
concurring), he has failed to persuade any of his colleagues on the Court to join him in that
position.
135. Id. at 644 (Souter, J., dissenting). But see infra notes 142-57 and accompanying text
(distinguishing the Court's current conception of federalism from the discredited dual-or
"categorical"-federalism of the Court's past).
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forgotten. Namely, if the state and federal governments are to compete
with one another in the manner that the Framers envisioned, both
sovereigns must be assured of opportunities to prove their competence
to the American people, and any interpretation of Congress's
enumerated powers that threatens to rob the states of all such
opportunities must be rejected.
Reduced to its essentials, the argument runs as follows: The
Constitution assures both the federal government and the states of
their own respective proving grounds. 136 For the federal government,
that assurance appears principally in the form of Congress's
enumerated powers and the Supremacy Clause; 137 for the states, it
appears principally in the form of the Tenth Amendment. 138 Congress
is assured that, no matter how popular the states become, it always
will be able to regulate matters that fall within its enumerated
powers, while the states are assured that Congress will not be able to
use the Supremacy Clause to deprive them of all opportunities to earn
the people's affection. 139 Any interpretation of Congress's enumerated
powers that would permit Congress to regulate all significant areas of
human activity and thereby force the states entirely to the sidelines
must, therefore, be rejected. In the Court's eyes, the interpretations
advanced in Lopez and Morrison were just such interpretations.
Of course, even if the Court had upheld the legislation at issue
in Lopez and Morrison, the states still would have been left with
plenty of opportunities to prove their competence. After all, the Gun-
Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act did not
136. Pierre Salmon similarly argues that, for there to be vertical competition in a federal
system of government, there must be constitutional rules that prevent one level of government
from unilaterally stripping power from the other. See Salmon, supra note 72, at 36.
137. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing the primary enumeration of Congress's powers);
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ('This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ....").
138. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."). That is not to say that the Constitution assures the two sovereigns of equal measures of
power. Indeed, Congress's enumerated powers, when combined with the power of preemption,
undoubtedly deal the federal government a stronger hand. Cf. New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 159 (1992) ("[T]he Supremacy Clause gives the Federal Government a decided
advantage in the delicate balance the Constitution strikes between state and federal power.")
(internal alteration and quotation omitted).
139. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, for example, the Court
acknowledged that Article I, Section 8 "works a[ ] sharp contraction of state sovereignty by
authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legislative powers and (in conjunction with the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation." 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985).
Yet the Court hastened to add that "the limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated
nature of Congress's Article I powers" is one of the means by which "the role of the States in the
federal system" is preserved. Id. at 550.
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broadly preempt the states' civil and criminal codes. If the courts are
ever to adjudicate federalism disputes, and if concerns about
maintaining a proving ground for the states are properly to animate
those federalism rulings, should the courts simply wait until the
states really are at risk of losing all opportunities to earn the people's
affection before declaring federal legislation unconstitutional on these
grounds?
Probably not. The problem with telling the courts that their
role is to intervene only when there is a federalism crisis is that the
judiciary lacks a principled means of assessing the states' competitive
strength at any given moment in time and of assessing the affection-
earning value of specified areas of regulatory concern. Those are
political judgments that the courts simply are not equipped to
make.' 40 Yet the Constitution does not call upon the courts to make
such finely calibrated political assessments. Instead, it seeks to assure
the states of a proving ground by enumerating Congress's powers and
by reserving the balance of power for the states. Courts are left,
therefore, with two options: either they can refrain from adjudicating
claims that Congress has exceeded its enumerated powers-an option
that some have urged the Court to select141-- or they can try to
interpret Congress's enumerated powers in a manner that places a
realm of public concerns beyond Congress's reach. By distinguishing
between those activities that are economic or commercial in nature
140. Such an approach also would produce the anomalous result that the same piece of
federal legislation might be upheld one month but declared unconstitutional the next, entirely
because the states' other regulatory opportunities had decreased in the interim.
141. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 113, at 193-94 (listing federalism issues that the author
believes should be deemed nonjusticiable). If the Court is instead going to identify limits on
Congress's enumerated powers, there will be occasions when the Court's rulings seem ironic in
light of state support for the federal legislation at issue. In Morrison, for example, there was
widespread support among state officials for the civil-remedy provision of the Violence Against
Women Act. See Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 109, 119-20 (2000). It might, therefore, have seemed odd for the Court to
invalidate that provision in the name of preserving a proving ground for the states-a proving
ground that the states seemed perfectly happy to surrender. Cf. Judith Olans Brown & Peter D.
Enrich, Nostalgic Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 59 (2000) (arguing that the Morrison
Court's reasoning is "opaque, particularly in light of the massive record of state acknowledged
failure to remedy violence against women and the overwhelming state support for a federal
remedy"). Yet unless state approval is to be accorded dispositive significance in enumerated-
powers cases, the Court must consider whether a constitutional construction applied in a case
featuring state approval would pave the way for federal intrusions in cases where states wish to
preserve their regulatory control. In Morrison, the Court found that the only way to sustain the
civil-remedy provision under the Commerce Clause would be to adopt an interpretation that
would permit Congress to regulate all criminal activity. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 615 (2000). The Court refused to take that step. Id.
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and those that are not, the Court has accepted the challenge of
negotiating the latter course.
It would be easy-but a serious mistake-to confuse the
modern Court's economic/noneconomic and local/national distinctions
with the "dual federalism" of the nineteenth-century Court. 142 The
hallmarks of that dual federalism were an emphasis on the fact that
Congress must act within the confines of its enumerated powers; a
belief that the states and the federal government have few, if any,
overlapping areas of responsibility and are wholly sovereign within
their respective spheres of activity; and a belief that the federal-state
relationship "is one of tension rather than collaboration." 143 The
primary focus of federal-state competition under a dual federalism
regime is not which of the two sovereigns has best made its case to the
American people for regulating a given matter, but rather where
courts should draw the line that separates state and federal powers. 14
4
Prior to its New Deal capitulation, for example, the Court often
attempted to draw a sharp distinction between interstate and
intrastate commerce. 145 In Gibbons v. Ogden,1 46 Chief Justice Marshall
142. See generally Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION AMONG
STATES, supra note 9, at 67 ("Until the 1930s, the regnant theory of federalism in the United
States, as elsewhere, was ... 'dual federalism.' ").
143. Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950). The
classic judicial statement of dual federalism is found in Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. 397 (1872):
There are within the territorial limits of each State two governments, restricted in
their spheres of action, but independent of each other, and supreme within their
respective spheres. Each has its separate departments; each has its distinct laws, and
each has its own tribunals for their enforcement. Neither government can intrude
within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference therein by its judicial officers
with the action of the other. The two governments in each State stand in their
respective spheres of action in the same independent relation to each other ... that
they would if their authority embraced different territories.
Id. at 406. The Court's job, on this view, is to ensure that neither sovereign intrudes upon the
other's territory. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) ('This court has no
more important function than that which devolves upon it the obligation to preserve inviolate the
constitutional limitations upon the exercise of authority, Federal and state .... "); 2 JOHN A.
SCHROTH, DUAL FEDERALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 379 (1941) ("In [a dual federalism] system
the Supreme Court stands as arbiter between the two sovereign governments, state and
national.").
144. Under dual federalism, in other words, the primary locus of federal-state competition is
shifted from the political branches to the courts. Yet the political branches are not entirely cut
out of the picture: they can continue to enact popular legislation that the courts find
objectionable and can thereby force the courts to decide whether to reduce their own political
capital by declaring that legislation unconstitutional. President Roosevelt's battle with the Court
during the New Deal era illustrates this phenomenon.
145. Indeed, to read some of the Court's opinions prior to 1937, one might suppose that the
federal and state governments had little to do with one another prior to the New Deal, with each
merely operating in its separate sphere of influence. In reality, however, the Court's philosophy
of dual federalism was in tension with a pattern of federal-state cooperation that marked
numerous governmental undertakings in the nation's first century and that blossomed into an
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declared that Congress enjoyed plenary power to regulate commerce
"among" the states, but that the "completely internal commerce of a
State ... may be considered as reserved for the State itself."1 47 In
Hammer v. Dagenhart,'48 the Court similarly determined that states'
control over "purely local" matters was "as essential to the
preservation of our institutions as is the conservation of the
supremacy of the federal power in all matters entrusted to the Nation
by the Federal Constitution."149  Having determined that
manufacturing was an intrastate process, the Hammer Court held
that Congress could not prohibit the interstate shipment of goods
manufactured by children.' 50
The Rehnquist Court's insistence that "[t]he Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local"'151 certainly has the initial feel of dual federalism. 52 Yet there
era of judicially sanctioned cooperative federalism after the New Deal. See supra note 77
(describing early instances of cooperation). Daniel Elazar and Morton Grodzins remain the
leading proponents of the view that dual federalism never really existed as a practical matter,
and that cooperative integration has always been the norm. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN
FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 51 (3d ed. 1984); Morton Grodzins, Centralization and
Decentralization in the American Federal System, in A NATION OF STATES: ESSAYS ON THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 1, 6-7 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1963). Others have argued that the
Grodzins-Elazar view is too simplistic. See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, The Conditions of American
Federalism: An Historian's View, in AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 77,
at 51-56.
146. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
147. Id. at 195; see also id. at 203 (stating that the states retained the power to enact
"[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for
regulating the internal commerce of a State," and that "[n]o direct general power over these
objects is granted to Congress").
148. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
149. Id. at 275.
150. Id. at 276. The same conception of federal-state relations may be seen in the Court's
rulings regarding fugitive slaves. In Ableman v. Booth, Sherman Booth had been convicted of
aiding a slave's escape and had been sentenced to a month's imprisonment by a federal district
court. 62 U.S. 506, 507-14 (1859). The Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered him released pursuant
to a writ of habeas corpus, then refused to send the appropriate paperwork to the United States
Supreme Court when federal officials appealed the state court's decision. Id. at 508, 514. In a
ruling that remains good law today, the Court reversed, holding that state courts lacked the
power to order the release of federal prisoners:
[T]he powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both exist and
are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct
sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their
respective spheres. And the sphere of action appropriated to the United States is as
far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court, as
if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye.
Id. at 516; see also Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 107-08 (1861) (holding, for comparable
reasons, that Congress could not compel Ohio officials to arrest and hand over to Kentucky
officials a man indicted in Kentucky for helping a slave to escape).
151. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000); accord United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
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are critical differences. 153 Most notably, the Court today has not
sought to disentangle the two sovereigns' regulatory activities and
confine the sovereigns to entirely separate spheres. The Commerce
Clause as interpreted by the modern Court, for example, permits both
the federal government and the states to regulate economic activities,
so long as Congress acts only when there is the requisite connection to
interstate commerce and so long as the states stay within the confines
of the Dormant Commerce Clause.154 Because a vast array of human
endeavors presumably may be characterized as economic in nature, 155
there remain innumerable ways in which state and federal powers
overlap, thereby enabling the two sovereigns broadly to compete with
one another for affection and regulatory opportunities. The Court
merely has indicated that there also is a realm of activities reserved
for the states-a realm in which the states are assured that, no matter
how powerful the federal government becomes, they will remain able
to perform regulatory functions of value to their constituents.1 56 In
other words, the Court has implicitly seized upon the Framers'
insistence that the federal government have the opportunity to
regulate matters of concern to its citizens and thereby instill in those
citizens a sense of affection for the national sovereign, 157 and has
applied that same reasoning to the states.
Even if the Court today is not reverting to the dual federalism
of its past, significant problems remain unresolved, not the least of
which is determining, in Commerce Clause cases, how to draw the line
that separates those noneconomic matters that are reserved for the
states from those economic matters that Congress may regulate so
152. See David M. O'Brien, The Supreme Court and Intergovernmental Relations: What
Happened to "Our Federalism"?, 9 J.L. & POL. 609, 611 (1993) ("Justices on the Rehnquist Court
often invoke the language of dual federalism."); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001) ("The rhetoric of a 'dual
federalism' characterizes many of the Supreme Court's recent statements on the constitutional
law of federalism.").
153. See generally Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be "Revived"?, 51
DUKE L.J. 1513 passim (2002) (characterizing the Court's conception of dual federalism in the
1920s and arguing that it is distinct from any credible conception of federalism today).
154. See Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs
Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 159-60 (2001) (noting that "state regulation of interstate
commerce is unconstitutional only if it is discriminatory or very burdensome" and that "the
federal sphere, of course, is not exclusive").
155. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 3, at 630-42 (arguing that numerous household activities
have economic components).
156. Stated in terms of Venn diagrams, the dual federalism of the nineteenth-century Court
is best depicted as two circles in which the area of overlap is minimal or nonexistent, while the
federalism of the modern Court is best depicted as two circles in which the area of overlap is
substantial, but not total.
157. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (recounting the Framers' argument).
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long as there is a nexus with interstate commerce. As Justice Souter
observed in his dissenting opinion in Morrison,'58 the Court's previous
efforts to define subject-matter categories of state and federal
regulation were less than resoundingly successful, 159 and one can be
forgiven for believing that the economic/noneconomic distinction will
not fare much better. 160 That distinction might even have to be
jettisoned in favor of an alternative form of analysis-and if no
satisfactory form of analysis can be found, the courts might have to
withdraw from the realm of Commerce Clause disputes altogether,
leaving the fate of the states' proving ground entirely to political
forces. The Lopez Court itself conceded that it was unable to frame
"precise formulations" and that a certain measure of "legal
uncertainty" often would attend judicial efforts to determine whether
Congress had exceeded its limited powers. 16' Moreover, the stakes are
high when a litigant asks a court to declare a particular subject
matter within the exclusive control of one sovereign or the other,
because it is only in those areas where the two governments' powers
overlap that the people are empowered (absent a constitutional
amendment) to allocate power as they see fit. Defining the states'
proving ground is therefore a task with profound implications for the
freedom of the sovereign people.
Whether the Court's most recent effort to define an area of
state control ultimately meets with failure or success, however, the
Court's tacit faithfulness to the Framers' vision of federal-state
competition gives the effort an aura of legitimacy that it might
otherwise lack. The Court's determination to place limits on
Congress's power need not be seen as a manifestation of a desire to
undermine legislative outcomes that the Justices find ideologically
objectionable,' 62 although the Court certainly will be open to that and
other criticisms if it defines the sovereigns' proving grounds in an
unprincipled or ideological manner. Instead, the Court's recent
158. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 645-46 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
159. See, e.g., supra notes 184, 188 (describing the Court's failed attempt to identify
"traditional governmental functions" that would be immune from federal commerce regulation).
160. As Robert Post and Reva Siegel observe, "the domains Lopez and Morrison repeatedly
characterize as areas of traditional state regulation-the family, education, and the regulation of
intrastate violence-are permeated with federal law enacted pursuant to Congress's commerce
and spending powers." Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 484-85 (2000).
161. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-67 (1995).
162. But cf. Herman Schwartz, The Supreme Court's Federalism: Fig Leaffor Conservatives,
574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 119, 121-29 (2001) (arguing that conservative Justices




Commerce Clause jurisprudence may be seen as the beginning of an
effort to try to safeguard citizens' long-term freedom and regulatory
options by ensuring that the federal government cannot monopolize
the marketplace for the people's affection and that citizens always will
have two separate, field-tested sovereigns making persuasive claims
to their trust.
2. To Ensure Autonomy
In its two leading cases on intergovernmental immunities, New
York v. United States163 and Printz v. United States,164 the Rehnquist
Court struck down provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985 and of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act, respectively, finding that the federal government had
impermissibly attempted to force the states' legislative and executive
officials to implement federal policy.165 In both cases, the Court
emphasized that the Constitution does not permit the federal
government "to require the States to govern according to Congress'
instructions"'166 or to " 'commandeer' state governments into the
service of federal regulatory purposes . *..."167 "It is an essential
attribute of the States' retained sovereignty," Justice Scalia wrote for
the Court in Printz, "that they remain independent and autonomous
within their proper sphere of authority.' 68
In a separate line of cases, the Court has broadly construed the
states' sovereign immunity from private lawsuits. In Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida,169 the Court held that Article I does not authorize
Congress to abrogate the states' immunity from private actions
163. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
164. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
165. See id. at 933-35; New York, 505 U.S. at 174-77. In Printz, the Court held that a
provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994),
impermissibly commandeered states' law enforcement officials by requiring them to perform
background checks on prospective gun purchasers. 521 U.S. at 933-35. In New York, the Court
held that the take-title provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985, 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1988), impermissibly commandeered states' legislators by
forcing the states to choose between providing for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste
generated within their respective borders and becoming that waste's owner. 505 U.S. at 188.
166. New York, 505 U.S. at 162; accord Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-28.
167. New York, 505 U.S. at 175; accord Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-28.
168. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928; see also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150-51 (2000) (explaining
that a federal statute runs afoul of New York and Printz if it forces states to regulate private
parties in a particular manner, but not if it forces states to engage in activities of a
nonregulatory variety) (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)).
169. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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brought in federal courts. 170 The Court strengthened the states'
immunity still further in Alden v. Maine,'71 holding that Article I
similarly fails to give Congress the power to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity in state courts.1 72 Most recently, in Federal
Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,173 the
Court held that Article I does not empower Congress to abrogate the
states' immunity from private actions brought before federal
administrative tribunals.
174
Both lines of cases are plainly aimed at reinforcing the states'
dignity and sovereign status.' 75 With its anticommandeering rulings,
the Court is trying to prevent Congress from legislating in a manner
"incompatible with the dignity and independence of the several
states."' 76 With respect to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the
Court has emphasized that, while one important function of the
doctrine is to protect the states' treasuries from attack, its
"preeminent purpose ... is to accord States the dignity that is
consistent with their status as sovereign entities."' 77
170. Id. at 72-73. Seminole Tribe involved a lawsuit brought by a tribe against the State of
Florida in federal court pursuant to a provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7) (1994). Id. at 47. The Court held that the statute "cannot grant jurisdiction over a
State that does not consent to be sued." Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial Power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.").
171. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
172. Id. at 712. In Alden, probation officers had sued the State of Maine in state court for
overtime pay pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1998). The
Court held that Article I does not permit Congress "to subject nonconsenting States to private
suits for damages in state courts." Id.
173. 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002).
174. Id. at 1871-79. In this case, a private shipping company had filed a claim with the
Federal Maritime Commission, seeking damages for a state's failure to provide a berthing space
for one of the company's cruise ships. Id. at 1868-69. The Court dismissed the lawsuit, holding
that the state was immune. Id. at 1879. The Court determined that "it would be quite strange to
prohibit Congress from exercising its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity in
Article III judicial proceedings, but permit the use of those same Article I powers to create
courtlike administrative tribunals where sovereign immunity does not apply." Id. at 1875
(internal citations omitted).
175. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 ("The federal system established by our Constitution...
reserves to [the states] a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with
the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status.").
176. Louis H. Pollak, Judging Under the Aegis of the Third Article, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
399, 403 (2001) (discussing Printz).
177. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1874, 1877; accord Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 ("The
generation that designed and adopted our federal system considered immunity from private suits
central to sovereign dignity."); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997)
(stating that sovereign immunity protects the states' "dignity and respect"); Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 52 (1994) (stating that "the States' solvency and dignity" are
the "concerns... that underpin the Eleventh Amendment").
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Scholars have leveled a number of criticisms at these decisions.
Daniel Meltzer argues, for example, that dignity is an inappropriate
foundation for the doctrine of sovereign immunity in a democracy.
178
Evan Caminker similarly argues that, when the Court declares that
states' dignity renders them immune from a broad range of private
lawsuits, the Court wrongly suggests "that individuals are
subordinate to states rather than the other way around."179 So far as
New York and Printz are concerned, Matthew Adler and Seth Kreimer
argue that "[t]here simply is no difference, even in general, between
permissible preemption and impermissible commandeering with
respect to the [commonly recited federalism] values of innovation,
diversity, tyranny prevention, and political community .... ,,18 o
Those are formidable critiques. The general thrust of the
Court's rulings begins to make more sense, however, if those rulings
are understood as efforts to maintain the state autonomy that is vital
to federal-state competition. To say that a sovereign is autonomous
means, again, that it is free to identify and pursue courses of action
that it believes will earn it the affection of its constituents.18 1 It is the
possession of autonomy-the control over its own reputation among its
citizens-that confers on each sovereign a measure of dignity and that
enables each sovereign to compete with the other for the people's
trust.1 8 2 When one sovereign compels the other to act in a particular
way-whether to subject itself to private lawsuits or to regulate in a
particular manner-the coerced sovereign is stripped of the ability to
act in accordance with its own assessment of whether the conduct at
issue will earn it or cost it the people's allegiance. As the Court noted
in a different context in Garcia,18 3 "the States must be equally free to
engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal,
no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else ... deems state
involvement to be." 184 If citizens are to benefit from robust competition
178. See Meltzer, supra note 5, at 1040.
179. Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sc. 81, 86 (2001).
180. Adler & Kreimer, supra note 4, at 143; accord Hills, supra note 4, at 822-30 (making a
similar argument).
181. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
182. Cf. Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Power and the Restoration of Federalism, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 52, 58 (2001) (stating, without elaboration, that the Court's federalism
rulings "insist that states retain a certain degree of dignity and status, and this is an important
precondition to the sort of competition between levels of government that the Framers
envisioned").
183. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
184. Id. at 546. The Garcia Court rejected the "traditional governmental functions" test for
determining whether, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress may restrict the States'
ability to perform given functions. Id. at 531, 557 (overruling Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426
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between the two sovereigns, neither sovereign can have carte blanche
to write the other's script.
Yet the Constitution makes it clear that Congress sometimes
may constrain the states' freedom to act as they wish. 8 5 When
exercising its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, for
example, Congress may abrogate the states' immunity and thereby
compel the states either to abide by federal standards or pay damages
to those injured by the states' recalcitrance. 8 6 Moreover, for those
areas in which Congress has preempted state law, the Supremacy
Clause bars the states from adopting regulations of their own
choosing.18 7 The challenge for defenders of the Rehnquist Court's
federalism jurisprudence, therefore, is to explain why it is permissible
for Congress to use its Fourteenth Amendment power of abrogation
and its Supremacy Clause power of preemption to prevent the states
from freely charting their own regulatory paths, but impermissible for
Congress to achieve that same objective either by abrogating the
states' immunity pursuant to the powers enumerated in Article I or by
forcing the states to regulate their constituents in a federally
prescribed manner.
Although that is a worthy challenge, the notion of federal-state
competition provides a promising framework for at least beginning to
meet it. In its rulings regarding abrogation and intergovernmental
immunities, the Court placed its finger on principles that, if too
frequently disregarded, would eviscerate the states' competitive
powers. In each of these cases, Congress had chosen regulatory
U.S. 833 (1976)). The Court determined that a "fundamental problem" with that test was that, by
inviting the federal judiciary to determine whether a given governmental function was
"traditional," it restricted states' freedom to engage in activities of their own choosing. Id. at 545-
46; see also infra note 188 (discussing National League of Cities and Garcia).
185. The Constitution itself places restraints on the two sovereigns' ability to act as they
please. For example, with few exceptions, the Bill of Rights equally limits the behavior of both
state and federal governments. In fact, one may understand the doctrine of incorporation as
driven in part by the need to place the state and federal governments on a level playing field in
their battle for political support. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 470-86
(describing the process by which the Court determined that, by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification, most of the provisions of the first ten amendments to the Constitution
apply to the states, rather than just to the federal government).
186. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5
("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article.").
187. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) ("[Uinder the
Supremacy Clause, from which our preemption doctrine is derived, any state law, however
clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law,
must yield.") (internal quotation omitted); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the
supreme Law of the Land .... ).
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methods that, if too often employed, would threaten to inflict
debilitating financial and reputational harms on the states-harms
that could undercut the states' ability to regulate in any area of
human concern.
Consider, first, the Court's decisions concerning Congress's
power to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Abrogation is an
extraordinary measure when viewed in the context of federal-state
competition, particularly when such abrogation permits private
actions for damages. Each dollar paid as damages by a state to a
private citizen is a dollar that the state cannot spend in ways of its
own choosing in an effort to please the larger public. Although
concerns about states' finances have previously led the Court in
unfortunate doctrinal directions,188 the validity of those concerns
cannot reasonably be questioned: because no sovereign has unlimited
revenues, a government must possess a significant measure of control
over its expenditures if it is to address those needs it believes are most
pressing. When it authorizes citizens to obtain sizable judgments
against the states, therefore, Congress is setting in motion a process
that could inhibit the states' ability to pay for programs that state
leaders believe are essential to earning the people's affection. That
same danger is present (though greatly lessened) when private parties
are allowed to sue states for nonfinancial relief, as litigation of any
sort can consume large quantities of the states' financial and human
resources.
188. In National League of Cities v. Usery, for example, the Court stated:
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States' power to determine the
wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out their
governmental functions, what hours those persons will work, and what compensation
will be provided where these employees may be called upon to work overtime.
426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976). On the strength of those propositions (among others), the Court
declared that, when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress cannot "displace the
States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions .... Id. at 852.
Nine years later, however, the Court abandoned the "traditional governmental functions"
test, conceding that courts had proven unable to find a principled way to distinguish between
those functions that are immune from federal regulation and those that are not. See Garcia, 469
U.S. at 538-47. This does not mean, however, that concerns regarding states' finances are
illegitimate underpinnings for constitutional doctrine. Rather, it means the Court must exercise
great caution when framing the doctrine to which those financial concerns give rise. By
categorically declaring that Congress cannot abrogate the states' immunity pursuant to any of its
Article I powers, see supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text, the Court has avoided the
dubious task of making fact-intensive, case-by-case determinations akin to those required under
National League of Cities. The Court faces a more difficult task when defining Congress's power
to abrogate the states' immunity pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, see
infra note 192 and accompanying text, but it is too soon to declare that the Court's jurisprudence
in this area will suffer the same ignominious fate as the jurisprudence it inaugurated in
National League of Cities.
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Abrogation also threatens the states with reputational harm.
Each time a citizen learns that her state has been haled into court or
that a sizable verdict has been entered against her state, she has
cause to resent the use of a portion of her tax payments for such
purposes, as well as cause to doubt the good judgment of her state
leaders and to view those leaders as no more worthy of respect, trust,
and affection than common tortfeasors. Consequently, a state that
frequently finds itself embroiled in defensive litigation can expect to
face an uphill climb when it asks its constituents for the power and
funds necessary to launch new initiatives.
Of course, a state suffers those same financial and reputational
harms when it waives its own immunity and subjects itself to private
lawsuits.18 9 When a sovereign consents to such actions, however, it
presumably is doing so because it believes it will earn greater political
support if it agrees to be sued than it will if it does not. There is no
reason why a sovereign should not be able to pursue that course of
action if, in the exercise of its own autonomous judgment, it concludes
that is what the people desire. But when the federal government tries
to force those consequences upon the states, it is directly undermining
the states' ability to engage only in conduct that they believe will earn
them the people's affection; indeed, it is forcing the states to engage in
conduct that they would not pursue if left to their own devices. So far
as the battle for the people's affection is concerned, therefore, the
ability of one sovereign to abrogate the immunity of the other is a
powerful weapon indeed.
None of this means that Congress should be entirely barred
from abrogating the states' sovereign immunity. The Fourteenth
Amendment was plainly intended to enable the federal government to
bring great pressure to bear on those states that trample upon
189. States also suffer those harms when they are sued by the federal government-actions
from which the states are not immune. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965)
("[N]othing in [the Eleventh Amendment] or any other provision of the Constitution prevents or
has ever been seriously supposed to prevent a State's being sued by the United States."). Yet if
citizens are unhappy about the federal government frequently dragging their states into court,
they can exert countervailing pressure on federal officials, thereby making this yet another
venue for federal-state competition. Indeed, the Court has explained that one of the reasons it
distinguishes between private actions against the states and actions brought by the federal
government is that federal officials must take "political responsibility" for federal actions, "a
control which is absent from a broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States."
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999). But federal-state competition's explanatory power
should not be overstated. For example, it does not explain the fact that private citizens may
obtain injunctions against state officers pursuant to federal standards even when complying with
those injunctions will cost the states money. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
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citizens' liberties. 190 It is no surprise, therefore, that the Court has
concluded that Congress may abrogate the states' immunity when
acting pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.191
But abrogation may be too powerful a weapon for Congress to wield
whenever it concludes that abrogating the states' immunity would
help achieve the objectives of legislation enacted pursuant to
Congress's numerous and wide-ranging Article I powers. Even when
Congress purports to be acting pursuant to its authority to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, we should be reluctant to declare Congress
entirely unconstrained-and this, of course, is another area in which
the Court has begun to act.1 92 For the states, the financial and
reputational consequences of rampant abrogation could be crippling.
By declaring Article I off limits to federal politicians bent on
subjecting the states to private lawsuits, and by identifying respects in
which Congress's power to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment is not
unbounded, the Court has applied the Constitution in ways that help
to ensure that states will retain significant control over their own
finances and over their own reputations among their constituents. Did
the health of the federal-state marketplace dictate that the entirety of
Article I be declared off limits? Perhaps not. When one considers the
importance of maintaining the states' autonomy, however, it should
come as no surprise that the Court wished to place some sort of
meaningful limit on Congress's power of abrogation.
The link between the Rehnquist Court's anticommandeering
principle and the need to maintain the states' autonomy is, at first
blush, even more apparent. When Congress forces state legislative or
executive officials to govern in a particular way, it undercuts federal-
state competition by depriving states of the ability to regulate in
190. See generally Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-48 (1880) (emphasizing that, by
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, the people shifted significant power from the states to the
federal government).
191. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. For a discussion of whether Congress also
may condition a state's receipt of federal benefits on a state's agreement to waive its immunity,
see Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Private
Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 303-44 (2002).
192. In City of Boerne v. Fores, the Court declared that "Congress [lacks] the power to decree.
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States" and that, when
Congress acts to enforce that amendment, "[tihere must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." 521 U.S.
507, 519-20 (1997). The Court already has applied that standard in a variety of settings. See, e.g.,
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-74 (2001) (concerning Congress's
attempt to abrogate the states' immunity from suit for discrimination against disabled
individuals); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000) (concerning Congress's
attempt to provide a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-91 (2000) (concerning Congress's attempt to abrogate the states'
immunity from suit for age discrimination).
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accordance with their own assessment of what will earn them the
people's affection. 193 Again, however, the Court's anticommandeering
cases are defensible only if one can justify the Court's distinction
between commandeering and preemption, since both deprive state
officials of the opportunity to regulate in whatever manner they think
will earn them the people's support. 194 Of course, commandeering and
preemption strip the states of regulatory freedom in different ways-
the former prescribes the manner in which states will regulate, while
the latter prevents them from regulating at all. 195 But why should that
distinction matter?
The explanations again fall into two categories-financial and
reputational. First, commandeering often poses a greater threat to
states' treasuries than preemption. When Congress preempts state
law, the costs of implementing the federal scheme fall primarily on the
federal government. 196 When Congress attempts to commandeer state
officials, however, it often seeks to shift at least a portion of the
federal program's costs onto the states' shoulders by acquiring their
regulatory assistance at no charge to the federal government.197 To the
extent this is true in any given instance, commandeering is more
damaging than preemption to federal-state competition for one of the
same reasons that abrogating the states' sovereign immunity is
objectionable: It prevents the states from spending their limited
resources in ways they think their constituents would prefer. 198
193. Significantly, state judges are not protected by the anticommandeering principle and so
must enforce federal law. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928-29 (1997) (citing Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)). This lack of protection makes good sense so far as federal-state
competition is concerned, because state and federal judges do not enjoy nearly the same latitude
to compete for the public's approval through differing interpretations of the law as state and
federal politicians enjoy to compete for the public's approval through differing approaches to
public policy.
194. Cf. Adler & Kreimer, supra note 4, at 143.
195. See generally Connecticut v. Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 122
(2d Cir. 2002) (stating that preemption "imposes no affirmative duties of any kind" on states'
politicians, while commandeering does impose affirmative duties on states' executive or
legislative officials).
196. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (stating that preemption offers
a state's citizens the opportunity "to have the Federal Government rather than the State bear
the expense of a federally mandated regulatory program").
197. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 930 (stating that, when Congress attempts to "forc[e] state
governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program,
Members of Congress can take credit for 'solving' problems without having to ask their
constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes"); cf. Hills, supra note 4, at 855-91
(proposing that the federal government always be required to pay states for services that state
officials perform at the federal government's behest).
198. As a basis for distinguishing the Court's current doctrines of preemption and
commandeering, however, this argument only goes so far. The Court has indicated that
commandeering is objectionable "even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of
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The second justification for the commandeering-preemption
distinction concerns reputational harm, a category of harm that, while
more speculative in this context than its financial counterpart, is
sufficiently plausible to warrant further exploration. On some
occasions, most citizens are undoubtedly ill informed regarding the
federal and state governments' relations with one another, and in
these instances reputational harm is not a concern. (Political
accountability, however, is a concern, as I explain in the next
subsection. 199) On other occasions, however, citizens' understanding is
surely more complete. In these instances, regardless of who pays the
costs of implementing federal programs, commandeering threatens to
demean the states (or, in the language of the Court, it threatens to
strip the states of their "dignity") to a greater extent than preemption
and thus threatens to place the states at a greater competitive
disadvantage.
By suggesting that commandeering demeans the states, my
contention is not that commandeering is more objectionable than
preemption because it causes greater harm to the states' psychological
well-being. Evan Caminker has argued that such concerns are "surely
silly" when applied to the states, 200 and I agree. Rather, my suggestion
is that commandeering threatens to force a reputation upon the states
that makes it more difficult for them to persuade citizens that the
states, not the federal government, are the most desirable repositories
of regulatory responsibility.
It is my strong intuition that many people believe a greater
infringement of autonomy occurs when a person is compelled to
engage in conduct that he or she finds objectionable than when a
person is compelled to refrain from conduct that he or she finds
desirable.20 1 As a general matter, for example, many likely would
judge forced labor to be a greater infringement of their autonomy than
imprisonment. When compelled to engage in objectionable conduct (as
with commandeering), a person is forced to devote his resources to an
implementing a federal program ...." Printz, 521 U.S. at 930 (citing concerns regarding political
accountability, which I discuss infra notes 207-50). Moreover, the Court does permit Congress to
impose financial burdens on the states in noncommandeering settings. In Reno v. Condon, for
example, the Court unanimously permitted Congress to compel states to perform nonregulatory
administrative functions at state expense. See 528 U.S. 141, 150-51 (2000) (allowing Congress to
prevent states from disclosing personal information about individuals unless state officials first
obtain those individuals' consent).
199. See infra notes 207-50 and accompanying text.
200. Caminker, supra note 179, at 85.
201. See generally GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 17 (1988)
(arguing that, to be fully autonomous, one must possess "some ability both to alter one's
preferences and to make them effective in one's actions").
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undertaking he would prefer to avoid. When a person instead is
deprived of the ability to pursue those courses of action that she finds
desirable (as with preemption), her autonomy is violated but she has
avoided the additional infringement that occurs when she is co-opted
by others and forced to associate herself with, and devote her energies
to, objectionable purposes.
If the federal government frequently were permitted to
commandeer the states' legislative and executive officials by
compelling those officials to engage in conduct that they would prefer
to avoid,20 2 therefore, many citizens might draw the following
inferences. First, although state officials have numerous opportunities
to influence federal legislation-through the very political
mechanisms that some believe should render federalism issues
nonjusticiable2 3-those officials lack the power, the political skills, or
the wits to persuade the federal government not to force the states to
implement federal policy in ways that state officials find objectionable.
Second, if state actors cannot shield themselves from autonomy-
infringements of the highest order, then those seeking powerful
government assistance would be best served by entrusting their own
well-being to the federal government, rather than to its weaker
counterparts. 20 4 Why deal with the puppet when one has direct access
to the puppetmaster? By allowing citizens to view the states in this
202. The facts in New York present a twist on the usual notion of commandeering, because
the federal legislation at issue in that case was endorsed by state officials at the time of its
enactment. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180-81 (1992). Printz-a case in which
law enforcement officials in Montana and Arizona objected to helping the federal government
conduct background checks on prospective gun purchasers, see Printz, 521 U.S. at 904-
illustrates the more straightforward species of commandeering that I have in mind here.
Although autonomy concerns are lessened when a state endorses the federal legislation at issue,
transparency remains problematic. See infra notes 207-50 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
204. One might argue that the possibility of such an inference is a reason to permit
commandeering-if states lack the ability to prevent the federal government from compelling
them to implement federal policy in ways they find objectionable, perhaps that is something
citizens should know when deciding which sovereign to trust. While plausible, that argument
does not lead to a conclusion with which all reasonable jurists must agree. A judge might
conclude, for example, that while citizens might draw the inference in question, that inference
does not provide a fair basis for discounting a sovereign's ability to regulate a broad range of
matters in a satisfactory manner. A judge might therefore wish to exclude commandeering from
the marketplace, just as she might exclude relevant evidence from a trial when there is a risk
that jurors will accord the evidence undue weight. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Of course, trials and
political markets are entirely different animals, and allowing the courts to get into the business
of determining the fairness of inferences a citizen might draw while shopping in the federal-state
marketplace itself poses a threat to the integrity of that marketplace. Again, however, my
purpose here is not to defend judicial intervention against all attacks. Rather, my intent is
simply to use the Framers' conception of federal-state competition to suggest a principled reason
why the Court might find itself comfortable with preemption yet suspicious of commandeering.
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way, commandeering threatens the states with greater reputational
harm than preemption.
20 5
This notion of reputational harm might help to explain why a
distinction between laws of general applicability and laws focused
solely on the states continues to lurk in the Court's discussions of
commandeering and federalism. Although the Court has not yet
clearly assigned dispositive significance to that distinction, neither
has the Court declared it irrelevant. Instead, the Court simply
continues to hint that federal statutes might pose a greater risk to
federalism values if they are directed solely at the states, rather than
at all persons and entities (both public and private) that engage in
particular activities.20 6  The Framers' notion of federal-state
competition suggests that, at least in many cases, the Court's
suspicion is well founded. When Congress enacts legislation regulating
public and private actors alike, it has a disincentive to impose onerous
regulations on the states because those same regulations would have
to be imposed simultaneously on private constituents whose affection
Congress covets. When Congress enacts legislation regulating solely
the states, however, not only are the states stripped of the protection
that comes from being grouped with voters whose affection Congress
wishes to earn (itself a significant concern), but Congress also is
afforded an opportunity to co-opt its competitors' regulatory powers
and thereby dilute the states' ability to portray themselves as
independent and potent sovereigns in their own right.
205. Cf. Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti.
Commandeering Rule?, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1316 (2000) (arguing that the
anticommandeering principle helps the states appear to be autonomous, credible alternatives to
the federal government); id. at 1337 (arguing that commandeering "demeans" the states by
treating them "as nothing more than puppets of the federal government"). The same point can be
made in a slightly different way. When the federal government creates a regulatory program and
forces the states' legislative or executive officials to help bring the program directly to bear on
the citizenry, state officials are serving as Congress's messenger. Congress has authored
regulatory legislation, in other words, and the states are merely delivering it to the people. If
frequently employed, such commandeering may cause citizens to become accustomed to
regarding state officials as mere functionaries working for a higher power. If that occurred, it
would become more difficult for citizens to regard the states as potent sovereigns in their own
right, and thus more difficult for states to persuade citizens that they, the states, are more
capable than the federal government of getting the job done.
206. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (stating that the Court need not
address the possibility that Congress can regulate the states only through generally applicable
laws, since the statute at issue is a law of general applicability); Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 (stating
that weighing burdens imposed on states might be relevant when evaluating the
constitutionality of "a federal law of general applicability," but is irrelevant when "the whole
object of the law [is] to direct the functioning of the state executive"); New York, 505 U.S. at 160
(distinguishing Garcia and other cases on the ground that "this is not a case in which Congress
has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties").
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Again, the occurrence of commandeering-induced reputational
harm is speculative. Many citizens are surely often oblivious to
federal-state relations, and many of those who do keep themselves
apprised of such matters may not draw the kinds of conclusions I have
posited. When confronted with a particular instance of
commandeering, for example, many citizens might resent the federal
government's meddling in state affairs and thus work to shift power
from the nation's capital to the states. Yet the fact that reasonable
minds might differ when it comes to predicting the reputational
consequences of commandeering is itself a reason to find
commandeering problematic. So long as the risk of reputational harm
is more than ephemeral, there is reason to be wary about giving the
federal government broad latitude to prescribe when, and how
severely, its competitors are exposed to it.
The courts, of course, lack the institutional capacity to predict
the precise financial and reputational consequences that would flow
from particular instances of immunity abrogation or commandeering.
Courts wishing to stay within their realm of competence are
presented, therefore, with a choice: They can either withdraw from the
scene entirely and allow Congress to employ such regulatory methods
whenever it can muster the votes necessary to do so-and thereby
trust that political forces will protect the integrity of the marketplace
for the people's affection---or conclude that the risk of market failure is
unacceptably high in the absence of judicial oversight and that
boundaries of some sort should be drawn around Congress's power to
employ those regulatory methods in the first place. By ruling that
Congress cannot abrogate the states' sovereign immunity pursuant to
any of its Article I powers and by prohibiting commandeering-a
regulatory arrangement that, while sometimes difficult to distinguish
from mere strong encouragement, is surely easier for the courts to
identify than precise financial and reputational consequences-the
Court has chosen the latter course.
3. To Ensure Transparency
In both New York and Printz, the Court also identified a
political accountability rationale for its adoption of the
anticommandeering principle. In New York, the Court reasoned that,
"where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may
be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while
the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
379
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insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision."207 The
Court reiterated the point in Printz, explaining that, when Congress
compels the states to regulate in a particular manner, it both enables
itself to take credit for popular programs whose implementation costs
have been shouldered at least in part by the states and creates the
risk that citizens will blame the states for unpopular federal
initiatives.
208
When it speaks of political accountability, the Court is
explicitly speaking the language of federal-state competition. If
citizens are to identify the changes necessary to rectify government's
failures, they must know which sovereign to blame for those
shortcomings, just as they must know which sovereign to reward for
government's successes. If one sovereign is permitted to prescribe the
other's conduct, and if citizens fail to perceive such commandeering
when it occurs, citizens may become confused regarding which
sovereign to hold responsible and so may lose their ability to assign
blame and praise in an accurate fashion. One may thus regard the
Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence as aimed, in part, at
providing something akin to the protections of intellectual property
law for federal-state relations: just as the law relating to trademarks,
for example, serves in part to prevent confusion among consumers of
goods and services, 20 9 so too does the Court appear eager to enable
207. New York, 505 U.S. at 169.
208. Printz, 521 U.S. at 930. In the years between New York and Printz, Justice Kennedy
used the political accountability rationale to explain why Congress must be limited to its
enumerated powers. There must be "distinct and discernable lines of political accountability"
between the people and each sovereign, he argued, so that the people know "which of the two
governments to hold accountable for the failure to perform a given function." United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). "Were the Federal Government to
take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern," he wrote, "the boundaries
between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would
become illusory." Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). By using the political accountability
rationale in this context, Justice Kennedy comes dangerously close to endorsing a return to the
discredited dual federalism of the nineteenth century, when the Court sought to minimize, if not
entirely eliminate, the areas in which state and federal power overlapped. See supra notes 142-
57 and accompanying text (discussing dual federalism). If the Court were to try to disentangle
state and federal governments' involvement in regulatory programs by assigning each sovereign
to an entirely separate sphere, then the overarching objective of federal-state competition-to
enable citizens to assign regulatory power as they see fit-would be thwarted.
209. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000) (prohibiting the use of trademarks in a manner
"likely to cause confusion"); Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. Vandam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 742 (2d Cir.
1998) (explaining that trademark law prohibits "a later user [of a trademark] from employing a
confusingly similar mark, likely to deceive purchasers as to the origin of the later user's product,
and one that would exploit the reputation of the first user"); see also § 1125(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting
the use of words, symbols, and devices in a manner "likely to cause confusion" regarding the
source or affiliation of goods or services); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 157 (1989) ("The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of
deceit: its general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source.").
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citizens accurately to associate regulatory products with their
governmental vendors.
Although it is here that the links between the Court's recent
federalism cases and a theory of federal-state competition may be the
most obvious, it is also here that the challenges facing an
intervention-minded Court may be the greatest. Those challenges take
at least two related forms. First, it is in the very nature of a federal
system of government for lines of accountability often to be
obscured. 210 Vincent Ostrom explains:
Fragmentation of authority [between the states and the federal government] is assumed
to confuse political responsibility in a democratic society .... Yet these characteristics of
fragmentation of authority and overlapping jurisdictions are essential attributes of
constitutional rule and of a federal system of government. 2 11
A certain measure of confusion among the citizenry, in other words, is
simply the price one pays for choosing federalism over alternative
forms of government. Indeed, if there are to be numerous matters that
the state and federal governments are jointly authorized to regulate,
and if regulatory power is to be differently distributed at various
points in time, it seems unavoidable that many citizens often will be
confused about which sovereign to blame or praise for particular
regulatory outcomes. Writing on American federalism more than 150
years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville exclaimed that it was "frightening to
see how much diverse knowledge and discernment it assumes on the
part of the governed."212 If that was true in the early nineteenth
century, when the federal government was active in only a limited
number of areas, 213 it surely is true today. Consequently, if it wishes
to use political accountability as a tool for resolving federalism
disputes, the Court must find a principled way to distinguish between
those acceptable ambiguities that are inherent in our federal system of
210. See Salmon, supra note 72, at 37 ("Whatever its merits, vertical competition [in a
federal system] makes responsibilities more difficult to ascertain. Voters are not well informed of
the precise relations between various levels of government.").
211. OSTROM, supra note 60, at 201.
212. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 42, at 164. He went on to express great confidence in the
American people's ability to live up to the task:
Nothing has made me admire the good sense and practical intelligence of the
Americans more than the way they avoid the innumerable difficulties deriving from
their federal Constitution. I have hardly ever met one of the common people in
America who did not surprisingly and easily perceive which obligations derived from a
law of Congress and which were based on the laws of his state ....
Id. at 165. De Tocqueville may have confused those who possessed a clear understanding of
governmental affairs with those who were merely sure of their opinions. Regardless, American
government has grown immeasurably more complicated over the past century, thereby making it
that much harder for citizens to assign political responsibility.
213. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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government and those unacceptable ambiguities that arise from
unconstitutional regulatory methods-a daunting task.
Second, a Court determined to create political transparency
could easily find itself on a path that leads to a dramatic reduction in
the regulatory freedom of the states-an outcome that is at odds both
with federal-state competition and with some of the other objectives
that our federal system of government seeks to achieve. 214 Congress's
enumerated powers are indisputably broad enough to enable the
federal government to continue to regulate a vast range of matters-
even the Rehnquist Court has shown no desire to construe those
powers in a dramatically narrower fashion. 215 If the Court tried to
disentangle the two sovereigns' activities to yield a more transparent
system of government, therefore, it likely is the states that would
suffer the greater loss of power. If the Court wants to eliminate the
risk that state officials will be blamed for federal failures or that
federal officials will claim credit for state successes, for example, it
presumably must prevent the states from consensually participating
in federal programs. 216 Such an outcome would not only foreclose the
states from seeking the people's affection by participating in popular
federal initiatives, but it also would place greater distance between
citizens and their regulators and would reduce the likelihood that
federal programs could be tailored to meet local preferences.
Proponents of federal-state competition, therefore, face a
quandary: While a certain measure of transparency is required for
that competition to work, how is it to be achieved in a system where
accountability is often necessarily obscured and where any
thoroughgoing quest for transparency likely would result in a sharp
reduction in states' regulatory activity? That problem is exceptionally
delicate, and its solution might rest largely (if not entirely) in the
hands of the political branches. Because state and federal politicians
have strong incentives to ensure that they are properly credited for
successes and that they are not unfairly blamed for failures, perhaps
the burden should rest on them to ensure that citizens have the
information they need to allocate praise and blame in an appropriate
214. See supra note 6 (quoting a prominent recitation of federalism's objectives).
215. But cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In an
appropriate case, I believe that we must further reconsider our 'substantial effects' test with an
eye toward constructing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause
without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.").
216. See Hills, supra note 4, at 828-30 (making this point and stating that "erosion of
political accountability is endemic to all forms of cooperative federalism"); Schwartz, supra note
162, at 124 ("The lines between state and federal authority are continually blurred, especially
since so many federal programs that are indisputably constitutional under, for example, the
spending clause, involve a mixture of state discretionary rules and federal requirements.").
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fashion. Indeed, citizens' lack of awareness of federal-state relations is
presumably often a function of the fact that politicians have not
deemed further educating the citizenry to be politically essential.
The Court, however, clearly is not currently inclined to cede
responsibility for this matter entirely to political actors. Writing for
the Court in New York, Justice O'Connor stressed that federalism
exists for the benefit of individual citizens, rather than for the benefit
of the two sovereigns and their politicians, and that politicians
therefore cannot cure unconstitutional federal-state arrangements by
blessing those arrangements with their consent. 217 The Court stated
that politicians sometimes might actually prefer commandeering's
obfuscation of political responsibility when the actions being taken
(such as the siting of disposal sites for radioactive waste) are likely to
be politically hazardous. 218 When the two sovereigns collude to conceal
responsibility from their constituents, the Court concluded,
"federalism is hardly being advanced."219 With an eye toward possible
avenues for future exploration, therefore, I close by briefly identifying
several ways in which the Court might approach the difficult task of
promoting accountability in our complex system of government.
Reconceptualize the function of clear-statement rules. The Court
frequently has indicated that, if Congress wishes to alter the balance
of power between the state and federal governments, it must clearly
express its desire to do so. 2 20 Clear-statement rules are designed to
serve a variety of purposes when employed in federalism-sensitive
contexts. The Court has explained, for example, that such rules help
the judiciary to be certain that Congress did wish to take actions
having federalism implications;221 they help to ensure that the states
are afforded an opportunity to respond to legislation having
217. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180-83 (1992); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45,
supra note 39, at 289 (quoted supra note 48) (stressing that the interests of citizens are superior
to those of politicians).
218. New York, 505 U.S. at 182.
219. Id. at 183.
220. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-64 (1991) (finding that Congress must
plainly state its intent to protect state judges with antidiscrimination legislation); South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (declaring that Congress must plainly state any conditions it
wishes to attach to federal grants to the states); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
243 (1985) (holding that Congress must "unequivocally express" its intent to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1971) (refusing to interpret a
criminal statute in a manner that would intrude upon territory ordinarily occupied by the states,
absent a clear statement that Congress intended such a result); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that if Congress wishes to preempt "the historic police powers
of the States," it must make its intentions "clear and manifest").
221. See Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 243; Bass, 404 U.S. at 349.
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significant federalism consequences; 222 and they help to ensure that
Congress achieves its objectives through the political processes on
which the states generally rely to protect themselves from federal
overreaching, rather than through judicial interpretations of
ambiguous statutes. 223 Although the Court has not yet explained them
in this way, clear-statement rules also may be seen as tools designed
to ensure that, when Congress alters the federal-state balance of
power, it places its intentions clearly on record, reducing the
likelihood that Congress later will be able to evade responsibility for
its actions or that states will be blamed for unpopular federal
initiatives. Although most citizens do not study the language of
federal legislation, clear statements of Congress's intentions at least
provide the raw material that politicians and activists need when they
wish to reveal those intentions to the public, just as such statements
provide the answers that citizens desire when trying to ascertain
those intentions for themselves. Once clear-statement rules are
conceptualized in this manner, the Court might find that one of the
best ways it can help to promote accountability is simply to enforce the
rules it already has promulgated and perhaps extend those rules to
other federalism-sensitive settings.
224
Strengthen the prerequisites for preemption. One area in which
the Court might strengthen its application of clear-statement
requirements is preemption. 225 As Judith Resnik has pointed out,226
the Rehnquist Court-sometimes dividing along familiar lines-
occasionally has been quick to find that Congress preempted state law,
in the absence of an unambiguous statement by Congress that it
wished to do so. 227 In such rulings, the Court not only deprives states
222. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
223. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464.
224. Congressional findings of fact might similarly be reconceived as helping citizens to
determine the nature of Congress's actions. Cf., e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640-41 (1999) (noting that Congress failed to find a
widespread pattern of unlawful conduct by the states before attempting to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995) (stating that
congressional findings of fact can help a court determine whether federal legislation is a proper
exercise of Congress's enumerated powers).
225. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts state law when Congress expressly
or implicitly makes clear its intent to preempt. Implied preemption is found when Congress
occupies an entire regulatory field or when state and federal laws conflict. See Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 376-77.
226. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 623 n.7; see also Massey, supra note 2, at 502-12 (arguing
that the Rehnquist Court has often disregarded the traditional presumption against preemption,
thereby exhibiting a surprising disregard for federalism values); cf. Weiser, supra note 94, at
1733 (urging federal officials to exhibit "a greater sensitivity to displacing state authority").
227. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540-52 (2001) (5-4 decision)
(holding that Congress preempted Massachusetts's regulation of cigarette advertising); Geier v.
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of the opportunity to pursue the people's affection in ways of their own
choosing, but it also allows Congress to deprive the states of that
opportunity without ever having to place itself clearly on record as
having wished to do so. 228 I am not suggesting that the Court abandon
its willingness to declare state law implicitly preempted when state
law and federal law conflict or when Congress occupies an entire
regulatory field. Rather, I am suggesting that, in close cases, concerns
about political accountability might cause the Justices to be less
willing to declare state law preempted in the absence of a clear
declaration of Congress's preemptive intent.229
Reconsider the analytic utility of the Guarantee Clause. The
Court has not yet assigned the political accountability principle a
home in the text of the Constitution. 230 By grounding that principle in
the Constitution's text, the Court might find itself able to define more
precisely the circumstances in which it believes accountability
concerns warrant declaring legislation unlawful. One candidate for
helping the Court refine its analysis is the Guarantee Clause.231
Deborah Jones Merritt has argued that, when Congress commandeers
the states, it violates the Guarantee Clause by impairing citizens'
Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867-86 (2000) (5-4 decision) (holding that Congress
preempted District of Columbia tort law governing a claim against an automobile manufacturer
that failed to equip a plaintiffs car with airbags).
228. Cf. Ann M. Lininger, Narrowing the Preemptive Scope of the Clean Water Act as a
Means of Enhancing Environmental Protection, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 165, 185 (1996) ("[T]he
Court's willingness to interpret preemptive language broadly undermines elected [federal]
representatives' political accountability.").
229. For a brief description of legislative efforts to strengthen the role of clear-statement
requirements in preemption analysis, see Michael S. Greve, Business, the States, and
Federalism's Political Economy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 895, 895-96 (2002).
230. In Printz, the Court grounded its anticommandeering holding, at least in part, in the
Necessary and Proper Clause. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (stating that
commandeering is not a "proper" exercise of Congress's powers); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
(stating that Congress possesses the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers"). Rather than tie the clause to its
concerns relating to political accountability, however, the Court tied the clause to the Court's
concerns relating to violations of "the principle of state sovereignty." See Printz, 521 U.S. at 924.
There certainly are occasions other than New York and Printz on which the Court has employed
political accountability rationales. In McCulloch v. Maryland, for example, the Court ruled that
Maryland could not tax a federally incorporated bank, in part because non-Maryland citizens
had no means of holding Maryland's leaders accountable for their actions. See 17 U.S. 316, 435-
36 (1819). Because that case concerned state interference with a federal initiative, however, the
Court was able to ground its concerns in the Supremacy Clause. See id. When the Court wishes
to find federal legislation unconstitutional on the strength of political accountability concerns,
that avenue is not open.
231. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government .... ").
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ability to hold their state leaders accountable. 232 While it has cited
Merritt's discussion of political accountability, the Court has stopped
short of grounding those concerns in the Guarantee Clause.233 The
Court's reluctance to rest its federalism jurisprudence on that
constitutional provision is likely a function of the fact that, since the
mid-nineteenth century, the Court has insisted that claims arising
under the Guarantee Clause raise nonjusticiable political questions. 2
34
Yet if a detailed exploration of that text would provide principles for
refining the Court's conceptions of acceptable and unacceptable
confusion, the Court should reconsider its refusal to adjudicate
Guarantee Clause claims.
Clarify the Court's Spending Clause jurisprudence. The Court
would lend greater strength and coherence to its political
accountability concerns if it clarified the distinction between coercive
and noncoercive uses of the Spending Clause.235 Although state
governments depend on federal funds for support, 236 the Court has
said that the Spending Clause allows Congress to make federal grants
conditional upon states' acceptance of wide-ranging terms: If states
find Congress's terms unacceptable, the Court reasons, they may
simply decline the funds. 237 Yet when a state agrees to abide by
Congress's terms, many of its citizens surely are unaware of the
details of the arrangement, thus causing the very kind of confusion
that the Court identifies when condemning commandeering. 238 The
232. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for
a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 60-70 (1988).
233. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (citing Merritt, supra note
232); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 930 (discussing political accountability, citing Deborah Jones
Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563,
1580 n.65 (1994), and making no reference to the Guarantee Clause or to any other specific
provision of the Constitution).
234. See; e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42
(1849). For an example of arguments in favor of finding Guarantee Clause claims justiciable, see
Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional
Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 516 (1962) (stating that "only the guarantee clause can
compensate for the deficiencies of the fourteenth amendment").
235. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... ).
236. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1938 (1995) ("Th[e] monopoly power that the federal government directly and indirectly
wields over the states' ability to raise revenue makes the states' financial relationship with the
federal government more closely analogous to that of welfare recipients than to that of public
employees."); supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the states' financial dependence
upon the federal government).
237. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987).
238. See Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan
Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 124 ("[T]he national electorate simply is not as likely to recognize
an abuse of federal power in schemes involving grants of federal money to the states as it is in
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Court presumably is not troubled by that confusion, however, so long
as the states' acceptance of Congress's conditions was voluntary-
responsibility is then properly laid at the feet of either sovereign since
both of them willingly entered the arrangement. Yet the Court has
acknowledged that "in some circumstances"-the nature of which the
Court has not yet defined-"the financial inducement offered by
Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure
turns into compulsion."239 If the states were indeed coerced into
accepting Congress's conditions, it would be unfair to hold them
politically responsible for their behavior, just as it would be unfair to
hold them responsible if they were commandeered by federal officials
in other ways.240 By clarifying the Spending Clause's distinction
between permissible encouragement and impermissible coercion,
therefore, the Court might begin to paint a more complete picture of
when citizen confusion is constitutionally harmless because
responsibility is properly attributed to both state and federal officials
and when citizen confusion is constitutionally unacceptable because
one sovereign compelled the other's behavior.
Take full account of the roles played by federal administrative
agencies. No credible theory of political accountability can avoid
addressing the ways in which federal administrative agencies shape
public policy and thereby influence the two sovereigns' battle for the
people's affection. Although the Constitution vests the federal
lawmaking power in Congress, 241 Congress may delegate broad
rulemaking authority to an administrative agency so long as it
statutorily provides an "intelligible principle" to guide the agency's
exercise of discretion. 242 Only twice, however, has the Court
cases of direct regulation."); Note, Federalism, Political Accountability, and the Spending Clause,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (1994) (arguing that conditional federal grants obscure political
responsibility because "federal legislators can point to the state's voluntary decision to accept the
funds as the decisive act," while state officials can argue that "Congress never intended to offer
the states a choice because the state could not, in practical terms, decline the much-needed
federal funding"). Indeed, even when citizens are apprised of the legal realities, it is not always
clear whom they should blame if they find states' compliance with Congress's conditions
unacceptable: should they blame the state officials who agreed to abide by those conditions or the
federal officials who attached those conditions to badly needed funds in the first place? Cf.
McCoy & Friedman, supra, at 125 (arguing that conditional federal grants obscure the lines of
political accountability even for those voters who are "astute").
239. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (internal quotation omitted).
240. Coercive uses of the Spending Power also are problematic because they infringe on a
state's autonomy. See generally supra notes 120-22, 163-206 and accompanying text (discussing
autonomy).
241. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
242. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see also Loving
v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) ('The intelligible-principle rule seeks to enforce the
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determined that Congress failed to provide an agency with sufficient
policymaking guidance. 243 As a result, Congress is able to delegate
vast power pursuant to the haziest of enabling clauses. Although there
are significant benefits that accrue from this state of affairs, 244 those
benefits come at a cost: Congress often is able to claim legislative
achievements without ever having to take direct responsibility for the
details of federal initiatives, unelected federal officials are granted a
significant measure of policymaking power, and citizens are
confronted with a maze of bureaucratic relationships in which political
responsibility can be remarkably difficult to trace.245 Moreover, in two
areas that I have already identified as problematic-implied
preemption and the Spending Clause-agencies sometimes play
surprisingly dominant roles, thereby compounding the difficulties
citizens face when seeking to hold government officials accountable. In
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,2 46 for example, the Court
determined that a Department of Transportation regulation implicitly
preempted state tort law,247 notwithstanding the Court's prior
explanation of the reasons why it ordinarily is reluctant to accord
implied preemptive effect to administrative regulations. 248 In Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education,249  the Court held that
Department of Education regulations-not a statute-satisfactorily
notified recipients of federal funds that, by accepting those funds, they
would be subject to certain kinds of actions for damages. 25° The
understanding that Congress may not delegate the power to make laws and so may delegate no
more than the authority to make policies and rules that implement its statutes.").
243. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935)).
244. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75 ("[W]e have almost never felt qualified to second-
guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those
executing or applying the law.") (internal quotation omitted); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in
our increasingly complex society... Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to
delegate under broad general directives.").
245. Depending on the applicable state law, the same problems may occur at the state level.
246. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
247. See id. at 874-86.
248. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1985) (stating that frequent implied preemption by agencies "would be inconsistent with the
federal-state balance" and that agencies have abundant opportunities to "make their intentions
clear," and thus the Court "will seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal
regulations, an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a field related to health and safety"); see also
Massey, supra note 2, at 504 (criticizing Geier on these grounds).
249. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
250. See id. at 643-44 (finding that adequate notice was provided by several administrative
regulations and by the state's own common-law principles). But see id. at 669 (Kennedy, J.,
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current state of affairs in each of these doctrinal areas might be
entirely unobjectionable, or it might require rethinking in one way or
another-but either way, the Court cannot credibly distinguish
between acceptable and unacceptable clouding of political
responsibility without employing principles that take full account of
the ways in which the Court permits administrative agencies to affect
the federal-state marketplace.
IV. CONCLUSION
For far too long, conversations about competition and
federalism have been dominated by talk of competition among the
states. 251 Interstate competition is indeed an important facet of
modern American federalism. Yet to focus solely on competition
among the states is to ignore a vital dimension of the federal system of
government that the Framers conferred upon us. Because the
Constitution offers citizens a choice between state and federal
regulation in a vast array of areas, state and federal officials wishing
to retain or increase their power have strong incentives to compete
with one another for an ever-increasing measure of the people's trust
and allegiance. A sovereign that persistently abuses the people's
confidence, squanders the people's resources, or fails to fulfill the
duties with which it has been entrusted risks losing power to its
competitor. State and federal politicians are rivals, therefore, in the
marketplace for the people's affection. As Alice Rivlin explains,
[t]he argument about which functions should be exercised by the federal government
and which by the states has been going on for more than two hundred years. There are
no "right" answers. The prevailing view shifts with changing perceptions of the needs of
the country and the relative competence and responsiveness of the states and the
federal government.
252
Although the Court has not expressly adopted a theory of
federal-state competition, its recent federalism rulings bear powerful
hallmarks of the Framers' vision of competition between the two
sovereigns. By insisting that there are local matters beyond
Congress's reach, the Court appears determined to maintain a
"proving ground" for the states-a domain in which the states are
assured an opportunity to prove their regulatory competence and
dissenting) (stating that neither the administrative regulations nor state common law "could or
did provide States the notice required by our Spending Clause principles").
251. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
252. RIVLIN, supra note 98, at 8; see also supra notes 30.102 and accompanying text




thereby earn the people's affection, no matter how powerful the
federal government becomes. 25 3 By limiting Congress's ability to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from private lawsuits, the
Court appears determined to ensure that states retain the financial
and reputational autonomy they need in order to pursue their own
strategies for winning the people's allegiance. 254 And by declaring that
Congress cannot commandeer the states' legislative and executive
officials, the Court both preserves the states' autonomy and tries to
ensure the systemic transparency that is necessary if citizens are to
allocate power between the two governments in ways that best serve
their interests. 2
55
To become reacquainted with the Framers' vision of federal-
state competition, to identify several of the requirements of the
marketplace for the people's affection, and to discover that the Court's
controversial federalism rulings are consistent with an effort to
preserve the vitality of that marketplace is, however, only a beginning.
For both scholars and the Court, a number of challenges lie ahead.
First, in each of the doctrinal areas in which it has begun to act, the
Court faces significant unresolved difficulties. The distinction between
economic and noneconomic activities, which now lies at the core of the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, promises to be remarkably
difficult to make. The distinction between permissible encouragement
and impermissible commandeering is not always easily drawn.
Perhaps most daunting of all is the task of distinguishing those
instances in which obfuscation of political responsibility renders a
regulatory method unconstitutional from those instances in which a
measure of unaccountability must be accepted as an inherent feature
of our federal system of government. These all are problems that will
demand our attention for years to come.
Second, the Framers' conception of federalism as a system in
which two sovereigns battle for the people's affection has wide-ranging
implications that require careful consideration. In my discussion of
transparency, for example, I identified a few of the ways in which the
Court might help enable citizens properly to distribute praise and
blame between the state and federal governments-reconceptualize
the function of clear-statement rules, strengthen the requirements for
preemption, revisit the question of the Guarantee Clause's
justiciability, clarify the distinction between coercive and noncoercive
uses of the Spending Clause, and consider the variety of ways in which
253. See supra notes 125-62 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 193-209 and accompanying text.
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federal administrative agencies impact citizens' ability to hold
government officials accountable. 256 There are numerous other
ramifications of the Framers' vision that need to be explored as well,
such as the ways in which political parties and special-interest groups
promote or distort the federal-state marketplace, the ways in which
state and federal campaign finance laws differently affect state and
federal candidates' ability to convey their visions to the public, and the
role of citizen initiatives and other nontraditional lawmaking
procedures, among others.
Third, as long as the federal government remains as powerful
as it is today, it would be tantalizingly easy for those who favor
shifting power to the states to try to justify any state-favoring doctrine
as necessary to preserve the states' competitive power. Any invocation
of federal-state competition as a dispositive rationale should instead
be accompanied by a rigorous attempt to tie the requirements of that
competition to the issue at hand. In the absence of such connections,
the normative power of the Framers' vision of federal-state
competition will be squandered, and critics will be able to charge that
jurists haphazardly invoke whatever principles they find expedient to
reach outcomes they find politically preferable.
Finally, the burden of demonstrating that judicial intervention
is superior to other means of protecting the federal-state marketplace
continues to rest squarely on the shoulders of those who advocate such
intervention. In this Article, I have focused primarily on developing
the links between the Framers' vision and the Rehnquist Court's
recent federalism decisions. To say that there are such links, however,
does not irrefutably demonstrate that the federal-state marketplace
cannot thrive in the absence of close court supervision or that judicial
intervention itself poses no risks to the marketplace. If the Court
wishes to serve as referee in the two sovereigns' battle for political
allegiance, it must be mindful of the need persuasively to demonstrate
not only that the Constitution entrusts it with that duty, but also that
it can fulfill that duty in a principled, praiseworthy manner.
Otherwise, the Court risks losing the people's confidence by appearing
partisan-and even the Court cannot thrive without at least a
modicum of the people's affection.
256. See supra notes 220-50 and accompanying text.

Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sover-
eignty and Applying an Agency Model to
Direct Democracy
Glen Staszewski 56 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (2003)
Successful ballot measures are commonly perceived as a
pure reflection of "the will of the people." Yet initiatives do not
appear magically on election ballots or in statute books as a
result of the electorate's wishes. Rather, such measures are
conceived, drafted, and vigorously promoted by identifiable
initiative proponents, who often represent particular special
interests and may not even live in the communities in which
their measures are proposed. The "myth of popular sovereignty"
in direct democracy should be rejected. Instead, initiative
measures should be characterized as lawmaking by initiative
proponents, whose general objective is either ratified or rejected
by the voters.
Rejecting the myth of popular sovereignty in direct de-
mocracy would alleviate many of the problems of judicial re-
view that commentators have identified. By treating the initia-
tive proponents as the relevant lawmakers, courts would be
able to identify impermissible motives underlying a measure's
enactment and continue using an intentionalist methodology of
statutory interpretation without resorting to a counterproduc-
tive fiction of "Voter intent. " On the other hand, express recog-
nition that direct democracy involves lawmaking by initiative
proponents intensifies the tension between direct democracy
and representative government, the problems associated with
the delegation of lawmaking authority to unelected actors, and
the absence of safeguards to encourage careful deliberation
and reasoned decisionmaking in the initiative process.
Initiative proponents are not the only unelected lawmak-
ers in our democracy. Administrative agencies have freely en-
acted binding rules based on broad delegations of authority
since the New Deal. This development has always been consid-
ered constitutionally suspect, but courts have allowed it to con-
tinue unabated largely because administrative law has devel-
oped alternative safeguards to replace those provided in the
legislative process by representation and the requirements of
Article I, Section 7. Specifically, administrative agencies must
comply with the notice-and-comment procedures of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, and their final rules must withstand
hard-look judicial review. Those safeguards ensure that agency
officials engage in careful deliberation and reasoned decision-
making and have thereby legitimized agency lawmaking.
A similar model is needed to constrain the proponents of
ballot measures and thereby legitimize the use of direct democ-
racy. This Article therefore draws on the agency model to pro-
pose amending state laws that regulate direct democracy to
subject the proponents of initiatives to the requirements of pub-
lic deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking that presently
constrain administrative agencies. The Article argues that
unlike previous proposals, such reforms would promote careful
deliberation, improve the legislative product, and provide a
heightened standard of judicial review that is well established
and directly responsive to the serious structural shortcomings
of the current method of lawmaking by 'the people."
